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“Without such freedom there would have been no Shakespeare, 
no Goethe, no Newton, no Faraday, no Pasteur, and no Lister”. 
(Albert Einstein, speech given at the Royal Albert Hall, 5th October 1933) 
 
 
1 Executive Summary 
This report examines the legal (de jure) and normative (de facto) protection for academic freedom 
in the UK, when compared with the other 27 EU nations.  The legal protection is assessed first, by 
examining the EU nations’ constitutions and legislative instruments; second, by means of an 
assessment of individual nations’ degrees of compliance with UNESCO’s 1997 Recommendation 
concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel; and third by means of a very 
detailed analysis of 37 differing elements of university compliance with an array of measures, 
such as international instruments, but also including (for example) the ability of academic staff to 
appoint or dismiss the Rector, Deans and Heads of Departments. In sharp contrast with the other 
27 EU nations, the constitutional protection for academic freedom (either directly, or indirectly via 
freedom of speech) in the UK is negligible, as is the legislative protection for the substantive 
(teaching and learning) and supportive (tenure and governance) elements of academic freedom.  
Additionally, the UK is similarly deficit in protecting academic freedom in line with international 
agreements of which it is a signatory, more especially UNESCO’s 1997 Recommendation 
concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel. Utilising the most comprehensive 
assessment of the constitutional and legal protection of academic freedom, the UK attains a score 
of 35%, which is less than the EU average (53%), and the second lowest among the 28 EU 
states.   
The analysis of normative de facto protection uses comparable data from over 2000 UCU 
members and 4000 staff in universities of the European states, gathered by means of similar 
surveys. It demonstrates that the low level of de jure protection for academic freedom in the UK is 
mirrored by an equally poor (if not worse) level of de facto protection.  The reality is that, in the 
overwhelming majority of instances, UCU members report statistically significantly higher levels of 
systematic abuse of their academic freedom, across a wide array of measures, than their 
European counterparts.  For example, 23.1% of UCU respondents (and 14.1% of EU 
respondents) reported being bullied on account of their academic views, 26.6% of UCU 
respondents reported being subjected to psychological pressure (EU = 15.7%), while 35.5% of the 
UCU cohort admitted to self-censorship, for fear of negative repercussions, such as loss of 
privileges, demotion, physical harm (EU = 19.1%).  Some of this abuse may be attributable to a 
lack of knowledge of academic freedom rights among staff – only 41.7% of the UCU cohort 
claimed to have an adequate working knowledge of academic freedom (EU = 49.2%), while less 
than half that proportion (20.6%) knew about the 1988 Education Reform Act, which supposedly 
protects academic freedom in the UK.  Not surprisingly, 81.6% of UCU respondents said they 
would welcome additional information on the concept of academic freedom and its rights and 
responsibilities. Furthermore, UCU members are much more likely to strongly agree than their 
European counterparts that the major elements of academic freedom (freedom for teaching and 
research, autonomy, shared governance and employment protection) have declined.  
In sum the very low level of legal protection in the UK is mirrored by a low level of awareness of 
the rights of academic freedom, and a high level of abuse. Work elsewhere suggests two possible 
options to ameliorate this situation. First, the provision of explanatory information and the creation 
of a training materials concerning academic freedom for UCU members, allied to a national 
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awareness raising campaign.  Second, an appeal to UNESCO that the UK government does not 
meet its obligations under the 1997 Recommendation (of which it is a signatory state). The stark 
differences between the UK and the EU, in terms of de jure protection and de facto realities, both 
demonstrate the necessity for such an approach and provide a highly credible basis for such an 
appeal. This strategy was successfully adopted by the Dansk Magisterforening, the Danish 
academic professional association, and led to an independent expert evaluation of the legal 
protection for academic freedom, and change in the law.  Repeated previous appeals by the 
Dansk Magisterforening to the national government to change the law were ignored.  However, 
the appeal to UNESCO, a supra national body, could not be ignored, as it cast Denmark in an 
unfavourable light internationally.  In the UK context, the possibility of an unfavourable 
international scrutiny will have even greater salience for the national government.  This is because 
any criticisms from UNESCO will run directly contrary to the public images depicted by most top-
rated research UK universities, who seek to attract and retain students, staff and donors alike, 
from across the world, by declaiming their adherence to the principle of freedom of speech and 
expression, as a means both of cultivating intellectual rigour and tolerance in students, and of 
encouraging original research of the highest quality.  Moreover, for many such institutions, fees 
from international students are now absolutely crucial to their financial survival. 
 
2 Academic Freedom: a neglected right in the UK 
Most teaching and research staff working in UK universities, if asked whether academic freedom 
was important to them, would answer in the affirmative. However, despite the apparent 
importance attached to the concept, very little academic research has been undertaken into the 
protection for academic freedom in the U.K.  Over 50 years ago, Lord Chorley, the (then) 
Honorary General Secretary of the Association of University Teachers, commented: “On the 
narrow front of court decisions there is very little to be said on the subject, nor has much 
systematic attention been given to it on a political, sociological or even educational basis.  
Academic freedom is indeed taken for granted in the United Kingdom, and matters taken for 
granted are not much written about in a systematic way”.1  Although academic freedom is no 
longer taken for granted in the UK, the situation has not much improved since then.  In fact, over 
the last 30 years, there have only been three major texts on academic freedom in the UK.2 
Moreover, writing in 2002, McGuiness3 averred that while there were more than 1000 reported 
judicial decisions dealing with academic freedom in the USA, the comparable figure for the 
Commonwealth nations was 203, of which only 6 reported cases in the UK dealt with the subject. 
Similarly, Aby and Kuhn’s guide to the literature on academic freedom4 lists 470 entries, but of 
these the vast majority relate to the USA, only eight relate to the U.K.  Sinder’s earlier, shorter 
bibliography5 of 180 academic freedom related publications lists only three relating to a British 
academic (Bertrand Russell), and only then because the City College of New York annulled his 
professorial appointment. Additionally Kaplin and Lee’s authoritative volume on The Law of Higher 
Education in the USA devotes 117 of its 9096 pages to a consideration of academic freedom 
                                                 
1 R. Chorley, (1963) “Academic Freedom in the United Kingdom”, Law and Contemporary Problems, 28(3): 647 
2 E. Barendt (2010) Academic Freedom and the Law: A Comparative Study, Oxford and Oregon: Hart Publishing. 
K. McGuiness, (2002) The Concept of Academic Freedom, Lampeter: Edward Mellen Press. 
M. Tight, (1988) (ed.), Academic Freedom and Responsibility, Buckingham: SRHE/OU Press. 
3 K. McGuiness, (2002) The Concept of Academic Freedom, Lampeter: Edward Mellen Press, p. 4. 
4 S. Aby and J. Kuhn (2000) Academic Freedom: A Guide to the Literature, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. 
5 J. Sinder, (1990) “Academic Freedom: A Bibliography”, Law and Contemporary Problems, 53(5): 381-392 
6 W. Kaplin, and B. Lee (2006) The Law of Higher Education Vol. 1 (4th Edition), San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, p. 605-722. 
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(including discrete sections on general concepts and principles; academic freedom in teaching; 
academic freedom in research and publication; academic freedom in institutional affairs; 
academic freedom in private life; administrators’ authority regarding faculty academic freedom; 
protection of confidential academic information; academic freedom in religious colleges and 
universities), and 66 additional pages to a consideration of tenure. By contrast Farrington and 
Palfreyman’s 723 page The Law of Higher Education (which was designed to be a UK equivalent 
to Kaplin and Lee) covers academic freedom in just sixteen pages,7 and devotes less than five 
additional pages to discuss the abolition of tenure. 
Other academic researchers have remarked on the dearth of coverage of the subject of academic 
freedom within the UK context. Jasper, for example, reported that: “my research has yielded very 
little education litigation, with next to no cases involving tenure and related issues such as good 
cause”.8  Similarly, Beloff could find “only one English statutory provision which makes a specific 
reference to academic freedom”.9 Assessing the reasons for this apparent lacuna in the literature, 
Barendt proposes three possible explanations. First, he suggests that maybe “universities prefer 
… to settle claims brought by any academics … rather than contest them”; second, he suggests 
that maybe “universities … show such respect for the individual academic freedom of their staff 
that they rarely have cause for complaint” (a notion that Barendt describes as “too complacent”); 
third, he suggests that “there is no constitutional guarantee of academic or scientific freedom in 
the UK”.10  The high incidence of interest among legal counsels and scholars in the USA is a 
reflection of the fact that academic freedom in the USA has no direct protection in law (unlike, for 
example, in Finland, where academic freedom is specifically protected in the 2009 Universities 
Act), and has only indirect protection under the First Amendment of the US Constitution, passed 
in 1791, which protects the more general right of freedom of expression. Consequently, 
academics in the USA have had to repeatedly argue in the US Supreme Court (with varying 
degrees of success) that they should, under the aegis of freedom of speech, be granted a wider 
freedom than is afforded to the general public.  As the use of this amendment to protect academic 
freedom has depended on the interpretations of the amendment by the Justices of the Supreme 
Court, which have varied over time, much of the literature on academic freedom in the USA 
centres on assessing the legal and moral validity of the changing interpretations of the concept 
made by the Supreme Court. The impact of the constitution on academic freedom in the UK is 
considered in Section 4 below. 
However, there are two other reasons why there is much less case law on higher education when 
compared with the USA, and other EU states.  First, with respect to the USA, it has a federal 
government system, and so responsibility for the provision of education lies with the states, the 
situation is the same in Germany.  Consequently, universities are subject to state law, unless the 
federal constitution is implicated (which is the case when considering the protection for academic 
freedom under the First Amendment right of freedom of speech). Hence, there are 50 state 
legislatures, each responsible for fifty different jurisdictions, and each possessing their own state-
based body of case law. Thus the high number of legal cases concerning academic freedom in 
the USA results, in part, from its federal system.  Second, until the 1988 Education Reform Act, 
                                                 
7 D. Farrington, and D. Palfreyman, (2012) The Law of Higher Education (2nd Edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 
451-468. 
8 S. Jasper, (1990) “Britain’s Education Reform Act: a Lesson in Academic Freedom and Tenure”, Journal of College and 
University Law, 16(3): 464 
9 M. Beloff, (2010) “Academic Freedom – Rhetoric or Reality?”, Denning Law Journal, 22(1): 118. 
10 E. Barendt (2010) Academic Freedom and the Law: A Comparative Study, Oxford and Oregon: Hart Publishing, p. 74f. 
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most UK universities were immune from any legal challenge in the courts.  Each of the pre-1992 
universities were autonomous corporations established by Royal Charter, under which the final 
resolution of any internal dispute was within the jurisdiction of the University Visitor, whose 
decisions were immune from legal challenge.  The role of the University Visitor was arcane for 
most academic staff, but the Visitor’s powers were considerable nevertheless.  As Peiris details: 
“The visitor's jurisdiction is a general jurisdiction over all matters in dispute relating to the students 
of the foundation and the internal affairs and membership of the corporation.  Since the visitatorial 
power is an incident of an eleemosynary corporation whose purpose is the distribution of the 
founder's bounty, his authority is confined to the province of the corporation's statutes and does 
not extend to matters governed by statutes of the realm, or by the common law”.11  Hence the 
reason that little had been written about case law involving Universities is that dispute jurisdiction 
was wholly the province of the Visitor, and could not be challenged externally.  In essence, 
universities were legally autonomous entities. However this was altered by the 1988 Education 
Reform Act, Section 206 of which stated that: “The visitor of a qualifying institution shall not have 
jurisdiction in respect of any dispute relating to a member of the academic staff which concerns 
his appointment or employment or the termination of his appointment or employment”.  Thus the 
1988 Act not only removed tenure and but also reduced the legal autonomy of universities.  
In sum, the major reason why there has been so little consideration or debate, among by 
academics and lawyers alike, of the legal protection for academic freedom in the UK, is that there 
is no protection for academic freedom in the constitution, either via direct mention of the concept, 
or indirectly under freedom of speech, while the relevant h.e. legislation is so sparse, that there is 
very little to debate. Davies makes the point that: “the legal protections for academic freedom in 
the UK are minimal”,12 exactly how minimal will be shown in this paper.  Within EU universities, 
academic freedom is protected indirectly via constitutional freedom of speech (and often directly 
in the constitution) and in legislation; in US academia, “academic freedom is a contested 
concept”13 as it has only indirect constitutional protection.  In contrast to both the US and the EU, 
in the UK higher education sector the right of academic freedom is a neglected, rather than a 
protected or contested, concept, and has been largely ignored by individual academics (most of 
whom have scant knowledge of the concept), universities (although most pay lip service by having 
an academic freedom institutional statement, owing to the lack of a UK universities’ act, these 
vary considerably in terms of length, comprehensiveness and accuracy) and government 
ministers and departments (who have viewed academic freedom as an impediment to the 
marketization of UK university functions). Hence, where there is negligible legislation, and 
therefore muted, if not non-existent, debate, as Barnett observed: “In such an environment 
academic freedom is not taken away; rather, the opportunities for its realisation are reduced”.14 
The position with respect to research into the de jure protection is mirrored when looking at the de 
facto situation. None of the three major texts on academic freedom produced in the UK over the 
last 30 years provide any insight as to either the effectiveness of constitutional and judicial 
protection, or the realities of how academic freedom operates, between academic staff, on a day 
to day basis within university departments. This dearth of empirical research into this topic is not 
                                                 
11 G. Peiris, (1987) “Visitatorial Jurisdiction: The Changing Outlook On An Exclusive Regime”, Anglo-American Law 
Review, 376(4): 381  
12 M. Davies, (2015) “Academic freedom: a lawyer’s perspective”, Higher Education, 70(6): 987. 
13 S. Fish, (2014) Versions of Academic Freedom: From Professionalism to Revolution, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, p. 142. 
14 R. Barnett, (1997) Higher Education: A Critical Business, Buckingham: SRHE/Open University Press, p. 53. 
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just a feature of the UK, but is universal.  As Åkerlind and Kyrooz15 point out: “To date, public 
debates and scholarly discussions about the nature of academic freedom have been marked by a 
lack of empirical data”.  A research bibliography encompassing the titles of over 2000 books, 
journal articles and academic papers on the subject of academic freedom,16 compiled by the lead 
author, revealed only eleven entries that featured any attempt at an empirical analysis of how 
academic freedom operates.  Of these only one was an article in a peer-reviewed journal, one 
was a government commissioned report, while the remaining nine were theses, most of which, 
unsurprisingly, had a very limited focus and scope, and all related to the USA. 
Rupe’s 2005 doctoral thesis,17 for example, examined college and university attorneys’ 
perceptions regarding challenges to academic freedom at higher education institutions in the 
USA.  The survey comprised seven sections, each of which included five questions. The three 
sections regarding academic freedom included professorial, institutional, and student academic 
freedom. The four sections regarding challenges to academic freedom included judicial or 
governmental challenges, internal or collegial challenges, institutional challenges, and extra-
institutional or non-governmental, outside challenges to academic freedom. The survey was sent 
to the 1680 members of the National Association of College and University Attorneys, working in 
both public and private universities, of whom only 179 responded.  This analysis was hampered 
by the low sample size and the atypical nature of the respondents – university attorneys, by 
nature of their subject of expertise, are more likely to understand the legal foundation of academic 
freedom than the rest of the university teaching and research staff (chemists, historians, etc.).  
The commissioned report was a study undertaken by Bennich-Björkman18 for the Swedish 
National Agency for Higher Education.  Bennich-Björkman interviewed 17 researchers (ten 
professors, two of whom were emeriti, three senior lecturers, two post-doctoral fellows, two 
contract researchers) at two Swedish universities.  The study’s small (and eclectic) sample, allied 
to the single focus on research to the neglect of the teaching function, which mirrors Sweden’s 
legal protection for academic freedom (which also has no mention of academic freedom for 
teaching in either the Constitution or the law, but provides legal protection for research) limits the 
study’s utility for comparative analysis. The only peer reviewed paper in this area, by Romanowski 
and Nasser,19 examined faculty perceptions of academic freedom at a university in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, and had a sample size of 94.  This paper appeared in 2010, but has only 
been cited in ten other academic books and/or papers since publication. This total absence of any 
substantial empirical studies of the working of academic freedom, demonstrates the urgent need 
for a study such as this, but also highlights the severity of the task – a lack of any previous work 
means that the research instruments required for this task have had to be built from scratch. 
To provide a comparative context for the situation concerning these de jure and de facto analyses 
of the protection for academic freedom in the UK, data from the other EU states will be used, for 
the following reasons. First, the genesis of the contemporary research university, of which 
academic freedom is an integral part, took place in Europe. As Goldstein relates, “the modern 
development of the doctrine of academic freedom is largely derived from the nineteenth century 
                                                 
15 G. Åkerlind, & C. Kayrooz, (2003) “Understanding Academic Freedom: The Views of Social Scientists”, Higher 
Education Research and Development, 22(3): 330. 
16Accessible from: http://eprints.lincoln.ac.uk/1763/2/AcademicFreedomResearchBibliography.pdf 
17 M. Rupe, (2005) “Higher education attorneys’ perceptions regarding academic freedom and challenges to academic 
freedom”, Dissertation Abstracts International, 66(12). (UMI No. 3197564). 
18 L. Bennich-Björkman, (2004) Has academic freedom survived? Stockholm: National Agency for Higher Education. 
19 M. Romanowski, R. Nasser, (2010) “Faculty perceptions of academic freedom at a GCC university”, Prospects, 40(4): 
481-497. 
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German concepts of Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit”,20 which are associated with the reforms 
instituted by Wilhelm von Humboldt at Berlin University.  Although there are some exceptions (the 
University of Salamanca was very important in the development of the Spanish university model), 
the majority of the EU’s universities followed either the model laid down at the University of Paris, 
or that of the Humboldtian Berlin University.  As Sanz and Bergan point out, the European 
heritage of universities is complex and multi-facetted, involving “the principles of academic 
autonomy, intellectual curiosity, the freedom to teach, pursue research and publish its results and 
rigorous standards of peer review ... (but also) ... fundamental societal values such as 
participation, community and equal opportunity”.21  Secondly, the histories both of the EU states 
and their universities have been closely interwoven, for example, scholars escaping the Great 
Dispersion from the University of Paris in 1229 helped to make up the contingent at Oxford; 
similarly, repression in the universities in Nazi Germany in the 1930’s led to an exodus of 
scholars, many of whom went to the UK or the USA.  For these reasons, when examining the 
legal protection for academic freedom in the UK, comparisons are more relevant with respect to 
the EU states than with (for example) the USA, Russia, India, etc. 
 
3 The Four Pillars of Academic Freedom22 
Before any study of academic freedom can commence, it is necessary to provide a working 
definition of the concept.  Accurately, but unhelpfully, Altbach relates that “Academic freedom 
seems a simple concept, and in essence it is, but it is also difficult to define”, but nevertheless 
agrees that “academic freedom needs a universal definition … (as) the lack of agreement on the 
nature of academic freedom makes a common understanding and unified action difficult”.23  
Eustace makes the telling point that “there is a tendency, natural enough, to speak of any lack of 
constraint on an academic related activity as an academic freedom. So the argument may 
conflate a wide range of concepts”.24  However, this problem has been compounded by 
academics themselves – when the limits of academic freedom are imprecise, it is more difficult for 
those accused of infringing academic freedom to successfully plead their innocence.  
Consequently, as Manan points out “there are professors who used academic freedom as a 
weapon to defend themselves from their performance being evaluated by the academic 
community”.25  The reverse was probably true in the UK where, although academic freedom was 
usually written into university statutes, the absence of any agreed definition in legislation allowed 
the Thatcher government to remove tenure, thereby irreparably weakening academic freedom. 
In terms of both definition and every day practicalities, academic freedom is clearly part of a wider 
set of complementary human rights, with an evident link between academic freedom and freedom 
of speech: as Connolly observes, “academic freedom is a kind of cousin of freedom of speech”.26  
However as Olivas rightly points out, “the concepts of free speech and academic freedom are 
                                                 
20 S. Goldstein, (1976) “The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What They Teach”, 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 124(6): 1293. 
21 N. Sanz, and S. Bergan, (2006) “Introduction: a word from the editors”, in N. Sanz and S. Bergan (eds.) The Heritage of 
European universities, Strabourg: Council of Europe, p. 16. 
22 For an in-depth description of these four constituent elements see T. Karran, (2009a) “Academic Freedom in Europe: 
Time for a Magna Charta”?, Higher Education Policy, 22(2), 170-185. 
23 P. Altbach, (2001) “Academic Freedom: International Realities and Challenges”, Higher Education, 41(1/2): 206 
24 R. Eustace, (1989) “Freedom for Academics”, Higher Education Quarterly, 43(3): 217. 
25 W. Manan, (2000) “Academic Freedom: Ethical Implications and Civic Responsibilities”, in G. Neave (ed.) The 
Universities’ Responsibilities to Society: International Perspectives, Kidlington: Elsevier Science, p. 255. 
26 J. Connolly, (2000) “The academy’s freedom, the academy’s burden”, Thought & Action 16(1): 71. 
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symmetrical and overlapping, not synonymous”.27  Thus, the presence of freedom of speech does 
not guarantee academic freedom, but makes its protection more likely.  Freedom of speech is a 
generic freedom granted to all, to express their opinions and beliefs by whatever method they 
deem appropriate, on any subject that they may choose, to all other people, but for no particular 
purpose.  Academic freedom, by contrast, is a professional freedom granted to a few, chosen on 
the basis of their professional competence, to firstly: express their informed opinions only on 
subjects in which they have accredited expertise, just to a group of individuals chosen on the 
basis of academic criteria, in order to educate them; and secondly to undertake research to create 
new knowledge, freely disseminated to their students and the wider academic community. 
Irrespective as to whether constitutional or legal protection for freedom of speech might exist in 
the UK (and it does not), experience in the USA suggests that it would be insufficient to fully 
protect academic freedom. 
Whilst acknowledging that “there is little consensus between parties as to what academic freedom 
actually means … the concept is open to a wide range of interpretations and has been used at 
time to support conflicting causes and positions”,28 most academic experts in the field would 
concur that academic freedom comprises two substantive and two supportive, elements. The 
substantive elements are firstly, freedom to teach.  This freedom will normally include some (may 
be all) of the following: freedom to determine what shall be taught (course content); freedom to 
determine how it shall be taught (pedagogy); freedom to determine who shall teach (via 
transparent selection procedures); freedom to determine whom shall be taught (the right to 
determine and enforce entry standards); freedom to determine how students’ progress shall be 
evaluated (assessment methods); freedom to determine whether students shall progress (via 
marking criteria and grade determination).  Secondly, freedom to research and, as with teaching, 
this element has associated liberties which will include: freedom to determine what shall be 
researched; freedom to determine the method of research; freedom to determine the purpose of 
their research (and thereby refuse to undertake research considered unethical); freedom to 
determine the avenues and modes (conference presentations, journal articles) of disseminating 
research findings to one’s peers, and the wider world. These two substantive elements are 
buttressed and sustained by two supportive elements: self-governance and tenure.  Self-
governance consists of the rights: to voice an opinion on the running of the university; to 
participate in decision-making within the university; to be able to appoint people to, and dismiss 
them from, positions of managerial authority within the university.  Tenure comprises the right to 
some form of job security within the university, via an agreed procedure involving a peer-reviewed 
assessment of academic accomplishments, following the successful completion of a probationary 
period of employment.  It also includes the ability to remove tenure from staff who fail to meet 
minimum levels of competence or to uphold professional standards of conduct. With respect to 
the granting of tenure, it is incumbent on the probationer to demonstrate competence, while for 
the removal of tenure the university needs to show due cause. 
There is a further element that is worthy of consideration, that is, the distinction between individual 
and institutional autonomy, as these concepts have particular resonance within the UK context.  
Individual autonomy and institutional autonomy are often conflated under the heading of 
“academic freedom”. Indeed Rabban has noted that academic freedom, has been used to refer to 
                                                 
27 M. Olivas, (1993) “Reflections of professorial academic freedom: Second thoughts on the third ‘essential freedom’”, 
Stanford Law Review, 45(6): 1838. 
28 G. Åkerlind, and C. Kayrooz, (2003) “Understanding academic freedom: The views of social scientists”, Higher Research 
and Development, 22(3): 328. 
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“both the freedom of the academy to pursue its ends without interference from the government . . . 
and the freedom of the individual teacher (or in some versions - indeed in most cases - the 
student)”.29  Although these two concepts are linked, they are different. Wolff’s study makes this 
distinction explicit viz. “academic freedom is the privilege individual academics may claim as the 
freedom to question and test received wisdom, to put forward new ideas and controversial or 
unpopular opinions without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing the jobs or privileges they 
may have at their institutions. Academic autonomy applies to the institution. It may be defined as 
the right of academic institutions to decide freely and independently how to perform their tasks”.30  
The link between individual and institutional autonomy originally derived from the process of 
academic governance within the stadium generale of the community of scholars.  Hence the 
granting of individual academic autonomy enabled scholars to participate directly in academic 
governance, and thereby have a tangible input into institutional autonomy by, for example, 
electing, from amidst their ranks, Professors, Deans, and the Rector – who were considered 
primus inter pares, and not primus supra pares.  This right of self-governance was crucial in the 
first medieval universities like Bologna, in which the civil authorities made all significant university 
decisions as they paid university salaries; while the right to nominate the Rector lay with the 
students.  As necessary, to avoid repeated attempts at external control, the scholars (acting 
individually, and as a body) would democratically decide, en masse, to decamp to another city, or 
even, another country.  Hence in 1209, after disputes between students and townsfolk, academics 
at Oxford fled from the violence to Cambridge, to found a university there.  In such institutions, 
provided that the opinions of academics were dominant in the process of institutional governance, 
their individual autonomy acted so as to maintain and legitimate institutional autonomy.  Such 
governance mechanisms were the norm in UK universities, at least until the publication of the 
Robbins Report in 1963 which acknowledged that: 
Freedom of institutions as well as individual freedom is an essential constituent of a free 
society and the tradition of academic freedom in this country has deep roots in the whole 
history of our people. We are convinced also that such freedom is a necessary condition of the 
highest efficiency and the proper progress of academic institutions, and that encroachments 
upon their liberty, in the supposed interests of greater efficiency, would in fact diminish their 
efficiency and stultify their development.31 
However, as Neave relates, “the expansion of higher education contributed powerfully to 
redefining the nature of academic autonomy. From the latter parts of the 1960s established 
models, the origins of which could be traced back over the previous century and a half, were 
revised”.32 This process has been documented in the UK by Griffith,33 among others, who cites 
two key points from the Jarratt Report viz.: “We stress that in our view universities are first and 
foremost corporate enterprises to which subsidiary units and individual academics are responsible 
and accountable”, “The tradition of Vice Chancellors being scholars first and acting as a chairman 
                                                 
29 D. Rabban, (2001) “Academic Freedom, Individual or Institutional?”, Academe 87(6): 17. 
30 K. Wolff, (2000) “Academic Freedom and University Autonomy”, in G. Neave (ed.) The Universities’ Responsibilities to 
Society: International Perspectives, Oxford: Elsevier Science, p. 198. 
31 L. Robbins, (1963) Higher Education Report of the Committee appointed by the Prime Minister under the Chairmanship 
of Lord Robbins 1961–1963, (Cmnd. 2154), London: HMSO, p. 228f. 
32 G. Neave, (1988) “On Being Economical with University Autonomy: Being an Account of the Retrospective Joys of a 
Written Constitution”, in Malcolm Tight, (ed.) Academic Freedom and Responsibility, Buckingham: SRHE/Open 
University Press, p. 39. 
33 J. Griffith, (1990) “The Education Reform Act: abolishing the independent status of the universities”, Education and the 
Law, 2(3): 97-108. 
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of the Senate carrying out its will, rather than leading it strongly, is changing”.34  Neave further 
demonstrates that similar policies in other European states in the 1960s and 1970s created a 
situation in which “autonomy can be exercised only on condition that the individual institute or 
department fulfils national or establishment norms which are continually to be renegotiated in the 
light of public policy”.35  Consequently, under the misleading aegis of academic freedom, national 
and European governments and NGOs have called for greater institutional autonomy for 
universities, e.g., the EUA’s Prague Declaration stated that: “Universities need strengthened 
autonomy to better serve society and specifically to ensure favourable regulatory frameworks 
which allow university leaders to design internal structures efficiently, select and train staff, shape 
academic programmes and use financial resources, all of these in line with their specific 
institutional missions and profiles”.36 
 
4 Constitutional Protection for Academic Freedom  
In legal terms, constitutions are the supreme authority with respect to the canon of civil and 
criminal law of individual states.  For example, in the USA, all appeals in law that go to the 
Supreme Court, acting as the highest court in the land, do so because the Supreme Court is the 
final interpreter of federal constitutional law, and ultimate arbiter as to the meaning of the 
Constitution itself.  The situation with respect to the constitutional protection for academic freedom 
in the UK differs from both the USA and the rest of the European Union nations.  The UK has no 
written constitution which could provide protection for freedom of speech, and thereby indirectly 
protect academic freedom, as occurs in the USA and in many EU states. The UK has an “unwritten 
constitution”, in which the system of governance is described in, and constrained by, a set of 
documents and “usual practices”.37  The sources of the UK’s unwritten constitution arise in statute 
law (i.e. law set down by the legislative bodies of the Houses of Parliament); common law (i.e. 
case law developed by precedent following the decisions in individual cases made by judges and 
courts); conventions (i.e. “normal” ways of doing things – it is now the convention that the Prime 
Minister must be a member of the House of Commons); authoritative works (i.e. books that have 
affected interpretations of the way in which constitutional processes operate, for example A.V. 
Dicey’s Law of the Constitution); and external agreements (i.e. the European Convention on 
Human Rights).  Hence, there is no single ultimate and unequivocal document of reference with 
respect individual rights to which an appeal can be made with respect to academic freedom.  So, 
for example, if an academic was removed from his post, without due cause, he would be unable to 
argue that the use of the Education Reform Act in this way contravened his right to academic 
freedom (or freedom of expression) under the Constitution (as there is no Constitution). 
To assess the constitutional protection for academic freedom in the UK, when compared with other 
EU nations, constitutional data from the 28 states was appraised in order to check first, whether 
there was any indirect protection for academic freedom, via protection of freedom of speech or 
expression; second, whether there was any direct protection for any of the elements of academic 
                                                 
34 CVCP, (1985) Report of the Steering Committee for Efficiency Studies in Universities (‘The Jarratt Report’), London: 
CVCP, p. 22, 26.  
35 G. Neave, (1988) “On Being Economical with University Autonomy: Being an Account of the Retrospective Joys of a 
Written Constitution”, in Malcolm Tight, (ed.) Academic Freedom and Responsibility, Buckingham: SRHE/Open 
University Press, p. 46. 
36 European Universities Association, (2009) Prague Declaration: European Universities – Looking Forward with 
Confidence, Brussels: EUA. 
37 A. Cammisa, and P. Manuel, (2014) The Path of American Public Policy: Comparative Perspectives, Lanham: Lexington 
Books, p. 58f. 
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freedom (freedom for teaching and research, tenure, etc.) in the constitution.  The full results are 
given on pages 1-4 of the Appendix Tables (available on request) and a summary table of the 
results appears in Table 1 below.  
Table 1: Constitutional Protection for Freedom of Speech and Academic Freedom  
Nation 
Is freedom of 
speech/expression 
protected in the 
Constitution? 
Are any elements of academic freedom protected in the 
Constitution? 
Austria Yes Yes – research and teaching 
Belgium Yes Yes – teaching 
Bulgaria Yes Yes – autonomy and research 
Croatia Yes Yes – autonomy and research 
Cyprus Yes Yes – freedom of research and university autonomy 
Czech Republic Yes No Protection 
Denmark Yes Yes - freedom of research and artistic creation 
Estonia Yes No Protection 
Finland Yes Yes – freedom of research and teaching, university autonomy 
France Yes No Protection 
Germany Yes Yes – freedom of research and teaching. 
Greece Yes Yes – freedom of teaching and research, tenure 
Hungary Yes Yes – freedom of research and teaching. 
Ireland Yes No Protection 
Italy Yes Yes - freedom of research and teaching. 
Latvia Yes No Protection 
Lithuania Yes Yes – freedom of research and teaching, university autonomy 
Luxembourg Yes Yes - academic freedom mentioned specifically 
Malta Yes No Protection 
Netherlands Yes No Protection 
Poland Yes Yes - freedom of research and teaching 
Portugal Yes Yes - freedom of teaching. 
Romania Yes Yes – university autonomy 
Slovakia Yes Yes - freedom of research and teaching 
Slovenia Yes Yes – freedom of research and university autonomy 
Spain Yes Yes - academic freedom mentioned specifically 
Sweden Yes Yes – freedom for research 
U.K. No Protection No Protection 
 
As the table shows, unlike the UK, all the other 27 EU states have a written constitution (usually 
expressed in one document), all of which have some form of protection for freedom of speech 
and/or expression (to which an appeal from a lower court could be made, in respect of academic 
freedom cases). In addition to providing indirect protection for academic freedom via protection for 
freedom of speech, this table shows that the constitutions of twenty of the European Union nations 
also provide some form of direct protection for academic freedom.  For example Article 20 of the 
Constitution of Spain states explicitly “The following rights are recognised and protected: c) the 
right to academic freedom”.  The constitutions of other EU nations don’t always refer to academic 
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freedom as explicitly, but the majority, nevertheless, provide some guarantee for the substantive 
elements of academic freedom, the Constitution of Hungary, for example, ensures: “the freedom of 
learning for the acquisition of the highest possible level of knowledge, and, within the framework 
laid down in an Act, the freedom of teaching”.  In sum, it can be seen that the constitutional 
protection for academic freedom in the UK, either directly or indirectly (via freedom of speech), is 
non-existent (as there is no written constitution) and in marked distinction with the other EU states 
in which constitutional protection both for freedom of speech and for some element of academic 
freedom is the norm, rather than the exception. 
 
5 Legislative Protection for Substantive Elements: Teaching and Research 
As was shown in Table 1, all the EU states have protection for freedom of speech in their 
constitutional documents (except the UK), and the majority also have some form of (indirect or 
direct) constitutional protection for academic freedom.  However, as well as providing protection 
for academic freedom within their constitutions (which is frequently couched in general terms), 
most of the EU states have specific h.e. laws that provide detailed information on how their 
universities are to be run – for example the Finnish Universities Law of 2009 has 93 sections 
covering (inter alia) mission; institutional autonomy; the university community; legal capacity of 
universities; freedom of research; arts and teaching; degrees and the degree structure; languages 
of instruction; organs of a university; board of the public university; appointment composition; 
functions and terms of office of the university board; election; powers and duty of care of the 
rector of a university;  composition; functions and powers of the collegiate body of a university; 
university regulations and rules; administrative procedure and confidentiality; employment 
relations of the personnel; duties; appointment and title of professor; liability under criminal law.  
Such laws usually contain an explicit reference to academic freedom.  In Ireland, for example, the 
1997 Universities Act states: “A member of the academic staff of a university shall have the 
freedom, within the law, in his or her teaching, research and any other activities either in or 
outside the university, to question and test received wisdom, to put forward new ideas and to state 
controversial or unpopular opinions”.  The legal protection for academic freedom in the UK h.e. 
sector is provided in a subordinate section of the 1988 Education Reform Act, entitled 
“Miscellaneous and General”, which states:  
There shall be a body of Commissioners known as the University Commissioners who shall exercise, 
the functions assigned to them by those sections. 
(2) In exercising those functions, the Commissioners shall have regard to the need— 
(a) to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received 
wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without 
placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their 
institutions; 
(b) to enable qualifying institutions to provide education, promote learning and engage in 
research efficiently and economically; and 
(c) to apply the principles of justice and fairness. 
The Higher Education Act 2004 further clarified the situation with respect to the powers of the 
University Visitor, as established under the 1988 Education Reform Act.  In Section 46 of Part V 
(Miscellaneous and General), the Higher Education Act states: 
(1) The visitor of a qualifying institution has no jurisdiction in respect of— 
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(a) any dispute relating to a member of staff which concerns his appointment or employment or the 
termination of his appointment or employment, 
(b) any other dispute between a member of staff and the qualifying institution in respect of which 
proceedings could be brought before any court or tribunal, or 
(c) any dispute as to the application of the statutes or other internal laws of the institution in relation 
to a matter falling within paragraph (a) or (b). 
(2) In subsection (1) “qualifying institution” has the meaning given by section 11. 
(3)  In determining whether a dispute falls within subsection (1)(b) it is to be assumed that the visitor 
does not have jurisdiction to determine the dispute. 
(4) Section 206 of the Education Reform Act 1988 (c. 40) (which is superseded by subsection (1)) shall 
cease to have effect. 
Thus any illusions about the possibility of residual powers for the University Visitor, after the 1988 
Education Reform Act, were comprehensively dispelled by the new Act. 
However, the situation in Scotland has changed recently with passing of the Higher Education 
Governance (Scotland) Act of 2016. The legislation followed a research review chaired by 
Ferdinand von Prondzynski, the VC at Robert Gordon University, but who was formerly President 
of DCU, and so knew about the protection for academic freedom offered by the 1997 Irish 
Universities Act. The research review team were of the opinion that “a core principle of higher 
education is the protection of academic freedom, in accordance with the UNESCO 
Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel, made in Paris 
on 11 November 1997”.38 Additionally, the review team recommended that a definition of 
academic freedom be incorporated in the statute governing higher education, based on the 
definition contained in Ireland’s Universities Act 1997. The new act does not adhere to the 
UNESCO Recommendation directly, but is similar to the Irish legislation. Part 2 of the new Act 
deals specifically with academic freedom and, borrowing from the Irish legislation, allows 
academics “freedom within the law to do the following things – 
(a) hold and express opinions, 
(b) question and test established ideas or received wisdom, 
(c) develop and advance new ideas or innovative proposals,  
(d) present controversial or unpopular points of view”.39  
Also, the legislation considerably broadened the membership of the governing body, which now 
has to include: 
2 staff representatives elected by the staff; 
1 representative nominated by the academic staff who are members of an academic trade union that has 
a connection with the institution; 
2 representatives nominated by a students’ association of the institution from among the students of the 
institution. 
These reforms represent an improvement in the protection for academic freedom and a greater 
involvement in governance by the academic staff. However, legislation on academic freedom in 
Ireland is infrequently invoked, as academics still have tenure. Hence how the Scottish legislation 
                                                 
38 F.von Prondzynski, T. Brotherstone, I. Macwhirter, R. Parker, A. Simpson (2012) Report of the Review of Higher 
Education Governance in Scotland, chaired by Ferdinand von Prondzynski, Edinburgh: The Scottish Government, p.7  
39 Higher Education Governance (Scotland) Act 2016, p.10 
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will operate in practice remains to be seen. Even with this legislation in place, it will still be 
possible for abuses of academic freedom to occur. What is required for the legislation to deliver 
tangible protection is the establishment of a neutral arbitration body within each university to 
investigate claims of abuses.  
To assess the legislative protection for academic freedom for teaching and research (the 
substantive elements) in the EU, copies of the relevant laws were sourced from each of the EU 
states. Gathering this data was difficult and time-consuming, although the implementation of the 
Bologna Process within the EU states has necessitated the translation of many h.e. legal 
instruments, some of the more arcane pieces of legislation in the more unfamiliar languages 
required recourse to online translation tools, followed by double-checking via secondary sources.  
The detailed results of this exercise are shown on pages 5-8 of the Appendix Tables (which are 
available on request), and a summary table of the results appears in Table 2 below.   
As this table shows two nations – Estonia and Malta – have no protection for academic freedom 
for teaching and research in the national legislation, and in Malta there is also no protection for 
academic freedom in the Constitution. At the other end of the scale, in Spain academic freedom is 
mentioned explicitly in the constitution and the legislation gives further protection for the individual 
functions of teaching and research, which further strengthen the legal protection for academic 
freedom.  Nine nations offer specific protection for research – for example the 2011 Law of 
National Education in Romania states that: “in higher education institutions the freedom of 
research is ensured in terms of setting the subjects, choosing the methods and procedures and 
capitalising results, in compliance with the law”.  Both Bulgaria and Slovakia offer specific 
protection for teaching and research activities in law, along with direct protection via their 
constitutions.  Five nations offer discrete protection for academic freedom in teaching – for 
example the Czech Higher Education Act guarantees “freedom of teaching, in particular with 
regard to openness to different scientific and scholarly views, scientific and research methods and 
artistic movements”.  Belgium and Croatia are unusual, as they offer some protection in law, but 
refer back to their Constitutions, which are superior legal instruments for the protection for 
academic freedom. Sweden is unusual as it provides legal protection for research but has no 
mention of academic freedom for teaching in either the Constitution or the law. 
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Table 2: Legislative Protection for Freedom of Teaching and Research 
Nation Is freedom to teach protected in legislation? Is freedom to research protected in legislation? 
Austria 
Yes – “freedom of sciences and their teaching and freedom of scientific and artistic activity, the 
dissemination of the arts and their teaching;…  freedom of study” 
Belgium 
Yes – “members of a higher education institution 
shall enjoy academic freedom” 
Yes –“researchers must, … enjoy a very wide 
freedom to carry out research” 
Bulgaria 
Yes – “academic staff … have the right to: develop 
and teach the study content of their discipline 
freely” 
Yes – “academic staff … have the right: freely to 
conduct, … scientific research and to publish the 
results” 
Croatia Yes –  “Academic freedom is enjoyed by all members of the academic community“ 
Cyprus No No 
Czech 
Republic 
Yes – “freedom of teaching, … openness to different 
scientific and scholarly views” 
Yes – “freedom of scholarly, scientific, research 
activities as well as publication of the results” 
Denmark 
Yes – “The university must protect … the 
individual's research freedom” 
Yes - The university must defend … the freedom of 
research” 
Estonia No No 
Finland Yes – “At the universities there is freedom of research, art and teaching” 
France 
Yes – “lecturers, teachers and researchers enjoy full independence ... in the exercise of their functions of 
teaching and their research activities“ 
Germany Yes – “Freedom of art and science and of research, teaching and study” 
Greece Yes – “In Universities, academic freedom in research and teaching … shall be safeguarded.” 
Hungary 
Yes – “lecturers … shall be entitled to the right to perform educational activities in accordance with their 
world view, ideology and values” 
Ireland 
Yes – “academic staff of a university shall have the freedom, within the law, in his or her teaching, 
research and any other activities either in or outside the university 
Italy Yes – “the freedom of teaching for teachers” Yes - “the freedom of research of professors” 
Latvia 
Yes – “Institutions of higher education shall guarantee 
the academic freedom of academic staff” 
Yes - “The freedom of studies, research work and 
artistic creation shall be ensured” 
Lithuania 
Yes – “higher education shall be based on … 
academic freedom and autonomy 
Yes – “Research shall be based on … freedom of 
creation and research” 
Luxembourg 
Yes  - “In the exercise of their teaching and research duties, members of the University shall enjoy 
academic freedom” 
Malta No No 
Netherlands Yes – “academic freedom: the institutions’ academic freedom is respected.” 
Poland 
Yes – “Higher education institutions shall be governed by the principles of academic freedom in teaching, 
scientific research” 
Portugal 
Yes - “autonomy …  affording both teachers and 
students intellectual freedom in teaching and 
learning processes”. 
Yes - In higher education institutions the freedom 
of research is ensured 
Romania 
Yes – “The academic freedom of the members of the university community is guaranteed. … they have 
the freedom of teaching, research and creation” 
Slovakia 
Yes – “academic freedoms and academic rights shall 
be guaranteed (b) freedom of teaching” 
Yes – “academic freedoms and academic rights 
shall be guaranteed (a) freedom of scientific 
investigation, research, 
Slovenia 
Yes – “higher education teachers … independently 
develop those areas of science, art … and care for the 
transfer of this knowledge.” 
Yes - “A university shall … ensure the following: 
freedom of research, artistic production and 
knowledge mediation”, 
Spain 
Yes – “Teaching is duty of teachers … which they 
exercise with academic freedom” 
Yes – “Freedom of research in universities is 
recognised and guaranteed.” 
Sweden No 
Yes – “research issues may be freely selected; … and 
research results may be freely published” 
U.K. 
Yes - “to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, 
and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions” 
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Legal protection for academic freedom in the UK differs from the rest of the EU states. First, the 
legal protection for academic freedom in the UK is not vested in a bespoke law which is designed 
to address either the higher education sector in general, or universities specifically. The section of 
the Education Reform Act relating to academic freedom appears in Part IV “Miscellaneous and 
General” of the Act.  The majority of the Act deals with unrelated items, viz.: Part 1 National 
Curriculum; Part II the incorporation of local education authority maintained higher education 
institutions; Part III the abolition of the Inner London Education Authority.  Second, the 1988 
Education Reform Act is worded such that the legal protection for academic freedom can only be 
invoked after someone has been removed from a university position.  The reason for this was that 
the purpose of the Education Reform Act was not to protect academic freedom, but to abolish 
tenure for staff, thereby removing a central supportive element of academic freedom.  To ensure 
that staff could appeal if their tenure was revoked without due cause, the University 
Commissioners were created to establish the validity of any claims brought on the grounds of 
academic freedom, when an individual academic claims that s/he has been made redundant on 
grounds other than “just cause”.  However, even this modest protection has been further diluted. 
The 1988 ERA established the duties and powers of the Commissioners, and their continuing 
work was confirmed each year by means of a statutory instrument, signed by the Minister.  But 
the last such confirmatory signature was on 1st April 1995, such that the Commissioners ceased 
their duties on 1st April 1996.   In sum, the legal protection for academic freedom for teaching and 
learning in the UK is generally at a lower level than the majority of other EU nations, although not 
as low as occurs in Estonia and Malta, and possibly in Denmark and Sweden.   
 
6 Legislative Protection for Supportive Elements: Tenure and Governance 
The supportive elements for academic freedom (tenure and shared governance) are critical to 
ensuring that the substantive elements (freedom to teach and undertake research) may flourish. 
However, whereas the legal protection for the substantive elements is usually readily apparent in 
the legislation (for example, Bulgaria’s 1995 Higher Education Act states that “academic staff … 
shall have the right to freely conduct … scientific research and to publish the results”), the 
legislation surrounding the supportive elements is more complex, nuanced and varied. Hence, in 
some nations there may be only one decision-making body (e.g. Senate), and the legislation may 
state that all the members of this body have to be elected from, and by, the academic faculty.  In 
others, there may be more than one body assigned to make decisions (e.g. Senate and the 
University Council) and the membership of these entities may be split between (for example) the 
academic staff, the administrative staff, the students, and external nominees (often from local 
business).  Similarly with tenure, in some nations the situation is readily apparent, for example, no 
form of tenure exists in the UK, while in Spain Professors may apply for the status of Catedrático, 
which, in essence, provides them with tenure and the status of a civil servant.  More usually, 
however, the attainment of tenured status varies considerably both between (and sometimes 
within) the EU states.  In order to assess the legislative protection for these supportive elements, 
as before, the relevant legislative instruments were examined for each EU nation.  Some caveats 
are necessary with respect to this analysis.  First, information relating to these elements is rarely 
available in English, and hence some meaning may be lost in translation; second, the legislation 
provides the “bare bones” of the systems of tenure protection and governance, while their day to 
day operation may not always exactly reflect the legal framework.  The first stage of this analysis 
identified the major elements in the legislation relating to governance and tenure. This was a 
protracted process, as the majority of legislative instruments in EU nations dealing with higher 
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education are detailed and lengthy – the Ley Orgánica 4/2007 which deals with higher education 
in Spain, for example, is over 25,000 words long – the total volume of text thus identified was 
circa 55,000 words. Hence the second stage was to summarise the detailed legal instruments, in 
order to answer the following questions: 
1) What are the major governance bodies (Council, Board, Senate), how are they constituted, 
and what are the roles of the academic staff in electing people to such bodies? 
2) Is tenure available to academic staff, if so, under what conditions? 
The summary data in relation to the legal protection for these two supportive elements of 
academic freedom is given in Table 3 below (more detail is given on pages 9-34 of the Appendix 
Tables, which are available on request). 
Shared governance has long been considered a vital element to securing academic freedom.  For 
example the Association of American University Professors argues that “sound governance 
practice and the exercise of academic freedom are closely connected, if not inextricably linked”,40 
and that “the faculty’s role in governance, is the foundation of academic freedom”.41  Similarly, 
Rochford has noted that “[a] traditional institutional protection for academic freedoms is through 
the tradition of participation by faculty members in academic governance”.42  Clearly legal 
protection for academic freedom for teaching and research is important, but unless academics 
can participate in governance, there is a strong chance that this freedom will not be fully realized.  
Similarly, if job security is not protected via tenure, then the presence of legal protection for 
academic freedom becomes irrelevant, as staff who believe that their academic freedom has been 
compromised can simply be removed from office by the university authorities. 
Although there are evident variations in the governance structure of universities in different states, 
analysis of the data on governance powers and structures in Table 3 reveals surprising similarities 
in the governance structures within universities in the EU. In all instances (apart from in the UK’s 
pre-1992 universities) national legislation specified precisely the composition, functions, and 
powers of the governance bodies in universities. In some nations, the composition of the 
governance was determined by local statutes, which made it difficult to assess which body 
exercised managerial dominance.  However, in 22 of the 28 states, there were two governance 
structures – invariably one had broad based executive power (the University Board), while the 
other had a deliberative function in relation to academic matters, (Senate).  In 10 cases, the 
academic staff were in a majority on Senate, but not on the Board.  Hence there was a balance of 
power between these elements, as Board decisions had to be ratified by Senate; additionally, in 
some instances this balance of power was tempered by the ability of Senate to choose (and 
dismiss) the Rector.  In six nations, the academics wielded majority power on both bodies, while 
in three states, the academics were in the minority on both governance bodies. In five nations 
there was only one governmental body, with the academics in the majority in three nations, and in 
the minority in two; finally in one nation there were three governing bodies, and the academic staff 
controlled only two.  
 
  
                                                 
40 Association of American University Professors, (1944) On the Relationship of Faculty Governance to Academic 
Freedom, Statement adopted by the Association’s Council, June 1994, p. 3  
41 J. Scott, (1994) Chair of the AAUP's Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure, quoted by Bowen, R., (March, 2005) 
in “For The Record: Born Free but in Chains: Academic Freedom and Rights of Governance”, Academe, 91(2): 119. 
42 F. Rochford, (2003) “Academic freedom as insubordination: the legalisation of the academy”, Education and the Law, 
15(4): 252. 
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Table 3: Legislative Protection for Governance and Tenure  
Nation Do academic staff control university governance? 
Is there 
Tenure? 
Austria 
No - the majority of senate members are elected by academic staff, but academic staff 
are in the minority on the university council; 
No 
Belgium 
No -The Board of Directors has 25 members, between 9 & 13 are academic staff, the 
Executive Council comprises academic staff, but which are appointed (e.g. the 
Presidents of the Education and Research Councils) rather than elected. 
Yes 
Bulgaria 
Yes – academic staff comprise 70% of the members of the general meeting,  and 70% 
of the Academic Council 
Yes 
Croatia 
Yes - academic staff comprise 60% of Senate; University Council (which is advisory)  
has six or twelve members, 50% are appointed by Senate 
Yes 
Cyprus 
No- Academic staff comprise 80% of Senate; 5 out of 14 members of the University 
Council are academic staff 
Yes 
Czech 
Republic 
Yes –the senate comprises representatives from the academic staff and the students 
(who may make up to 50% of the Senate members). Rector determines membership of 
the scientific board (30% are external) but with Senate’s approval. The Board of 
Trustees are appointed by the Minister but have oversight powers only. 
Yes 
Denmark No - external members must constitute a majority on the University Board Yes 
Estonia 
No - The rector, vice-rectors, representatives of teaching and research staff and 
students and certain other persons comprise the University Council the exact 
composition is regulated by the statutes. Senate is drawn from the university staff (not 
just the academic staff), and 20% come from the student body 
Yes 
Finland 
No – University Board has 7 or 9−14 members, elected by professors; teaching, 
research and administrative staff, and students but 40% are external appointees; The 
collegiate body (up to 50 members) comprises representatives of professors, teaching, 
research and administrative staff, and students; none of which can exceed 50% of the 
total  
Yes 
France 
No - academic staff constitute 29% - 50% of the conseil d’administration, but research 
and teaching staff may be in the majority on the commission de la recherche (40-73%), 
and the conseil académique (39-57%) 
Yes 
Germany 
No - 7 out of 11 members of Senate are representatives of academic staff , but 
academics comprise only 7 out of 20 members of the University Council 
Yes 
Greece 
Yes - University Council comprises 15 members; 8 are academics, 1 is a student, and 6 
are external, but are elected by the teaching staff.  Senate comprises up to 21 
members, and it is usual that + 50% are academic staff.  
Yes 
Hungary 
Yes - Senate is the supreme body and representatives of lecturers and researchers 
must constitute a majority. 
Yes 
Ireland 
No – academic staff comprise the majority of academic council, statutes determine 
numbers, composition, selection and appointment, but academic staff comprise only 
25% of the governing authority 
Yes 
Italy 
No - At least two thirds of the Academic Senate are drawn from academic staff with 
tenure. Whether the Board of Directors has a majority of external members depends on 
the university’s statutes which are approved by the senate. 
Yes 
Latvia 
Yes - Minimum of 60% of the constitutional assembly are academic staff, with minimum 
of 20% students. Senate comprises 75% academic staff and a minimum of 25% 
students.  
No 
Lithuania 
No - University council comprises 9 or 11 members, 4 or 5 appointed by the academic 
staff. Academic staff must comprise not less than 40% of Senate. 
No 
Luxembourg 
No - Governing council has 7 members, but they are appointed not elected. The 
proportion of academic staff on the university council is between 48-65%  
Yes 
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Table 3: Continued  
Malta 
No - academic staff representatives in the minority on the University Council and 
Senate. 
Yes 
Netherlands No – academic staff are not in the majority on the supervisory council or senate  Yes 
Poland 
Yes – composition of senate is determined by university statute but academic staff must 
comprise at least 50% of the membership, but not exceed 60%. 
Yes 
Portugal 
Yes – The general council comprises of 15 -35 members of which more than 50% are 
elected by the teachers and researchers. 
Yes 
Romania 
Yes - Senate comprises 75% teaching and research staff and 25% students’ 
representatives, and controls the activity of the Rector and Board of Directors though 
specialised committees. 
Yes 
Slovakia 
Yes - senate has at least 15 members, students constitute not less than one third; 
academic teachers and research workers (and other employees, if the statute includes 
them in the academic community) comprise the remainder; the scientific board is 
appointed by the rector, between 25% -33% are external members . 
Yes 
Slovenia 
No - Senate is elected by the senates of the faculties which are composed of university 
teachers and, if the statutes provide, by the scientific staff; students comprise 20% of 
Senate. Members of the University Board are drawn from representatives of the state, 
academic and other staff, and the students, in accordance with statutes. 
Yes 
Spain 
Yes - a majority of Senate are catedráticos de universidad, profesores titulares de 
universidad and contratados doctors, but statutes require that the various sectors of the 
university community shall be represented. The governing council comprises 53 
members representing the university community, reflecting the composition of the 
senate (a majority of which are academic staff), and up to three members of the social 
council not belonging to the university community. 
Yes 
Sweden 
No - The board of governors consists of the chair and 14 other members, three of 
whom are elected by the teaching staff, and three by the students. 
Yes 
U.K. 
No – pre1992 universities have governing bodies with a lay (i.e. external) majority; 
membership is specified in statutes and typically includes officers of the university, (lay 
and academic); co-opted members; elected staff members; and student 
representatives. Senate regulates and directs the university’s academic work; 
membership consists of academic staff, and student representatives are also included. 
Senates vary from under 50 to over 100 members.  Post1992 corporations have 12-24 
members, including up to thirteen external members, up to two teachers nominated by 
the academic board and up to two may be students and at least one and not more than 
nine co-opted members who have experience in the provision of education.  Academic 
Board is responsible for academic affairs, and normally consist of not more than 30 
members, individuals in senior management positions, i.e. PVCs, deans of faculty, 
heads of departments, must make up at least 50% of the membership. 
No 
 
Analysis of this data in the UK context, reveals some similarities and differences.  The pre-1992 
institutions were established by royal charter, and hence their statutes, rather than national 
legislation define their internal governance structures.  The normal governance model in pre-1992 
UK universities is to have a University Council, on which academic staff are in the minority, and a 
Senate, on which academic staff are in the majority – very much like the model in other EU states.  
Until the mid-1980s, power was relatively evenly distributed between these bodies.  However, the 
Jarratt Committee Report recommended that the role of the Council should change to enable 
them to “assert their responsibilities in governing their HEIs notably in respect of strategic plans to 
underpin academic decisions and structures which bring planning, resource allocation and 
accountability together into one corporate process linking academic, financial and physical 
planning”. The Jarratt Committee did not foresee any changes to the role of Senates, which were 
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“to continue to play their essential role in co-ordinating and endorsing detailed academic work and 
as the main forum for generating an academic view and giving advice on broad issues to 
Council”.43  This shift in the role of Senates meant that they became passive advisory bodies, 
rather than active participants in policymaking. This shift from collegial decision-making to 
management has produced disputes between managers and governors, operating via the 
Council, and the academic community in Senate. Consequently, universities’ governing 
instruments, Statutes and Ordinances, etc. have become of great significance.  The unequal 
power between these two bodies is in distinction to Universities elsewhere in the EU, in some of 
which the academic staff are in the majority, and in which the Senate (or its equivalent) plays a 
key role.  For example, in Austria, the University Council elects the University Rector, but has to 
choose from a shortlist of three candidates nominated by the senate.  Similarly, within the Czech 
Republic, the Senate approves the budget of the h.e.i., which is submitted by the Rector, and 
monitors the financial management of the h.e.i. and votes on proposals to nominate or dismiss the 
Rector.  Such powers are not unusual in other EU states, but were largely unheard of within 
British academia until, very recently.  As was discussed on page 12, in response to the research 
review chaired by Ferdinand von Prondzynski, the Higher Education Governance (Scotland) Act 
of 2016 altered and standardised the composition of university governing bodies in Scotland. 
These bodies now need to include 2 staff representatives elected by the staff; 1 representative 
nominated by the academic staff who are members of an academic trade union that has a 
connection with the institution; 2 representatives nominated by a students’ association of the 
institution from among the students of the institution. This is not identical to the more generous 
governance provision under the Irish Universities Act, (which allows: between 2 to 6 
representatives elected from the academic staff who are professors; 3 to 5 representatives from 
the other academic staff; 1 to 3 representatives from the non-academic staff; 2 to 3 student 
representatives), however, it does represent a strengthening of staff involvement in governance, 
in accordance with the UNESCO 1997 Recommendation. 
Tenure is separate from, but connected with, university governance, in that it guarantees staff 
involvement in governance.  As McPherson and Schapiro make clear: “Faculty members with 
tenure will have more independence. Administrators need to rely more on persuasion and less on 
negative sanctions ... Tenure increases the ability of faculty collectively to shape institutional 
decisions, through their actions in departments, colleges, or the institution as a whole”.44 
Assessing the importance of tenure in circumstances such as this, De George makes the point 
that: “By giving a large number of the faculty tenure ... they are in a position to defend the 
academic freedom not only of themselves but of all the non-tenured members of the institution, as 
well as the academic freedom of faculty at other institutions”.45  Similarly Menand points out that 
“Academic freedom not only protects sociology professors from the interference of trustees and 
public officials in the exercise of their jobs as teachers and scholars; it protects them from physics 
professors as well”.46  
As has been considered, the granting of tenure in UK universities was abolished by the 1988 
Education Reform Act, and although it is possible (but highly unlikely) that there are still staff 
                                                 
43 CVCP, (1985) Report of the Steering Committee for Efficiency Studies in Universities (‘The Jarratt Report’), London: 
CVCP, p. 36. 
44 M. Mcpherson, and M. Schapiro, (1999) “Tenure Issues in Higher Education”, in Devlin. M.E. Montgomery, J.W. (eds.), 
Forum Strategy Series, Forum Futures 1999 Papers, Washington: Forum Publishing, p. 81.  
45 R. De George, (2003) “Ethics, Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure”, Journal of Academic Ethics, 1(1): 18.  
46 L. Menand, (1996) “The Limits of Academic Freedom”, in The Future of Academic Freedom, (ed.) Menand, L., Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, p. 17.  
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employed in UK universities, who were granted tenure before the act was passed, their number 
must be very small. Despite tenure’s demise in the UK, it is still largely intact in most of the other 
EU nations, albeit possessing different forms. All the EU states, except the UK, offer some form of 
legislative protection for employment security.  However, it is noticeable that in many EU states 
tenure is now becoming harder to attain and keep.  For example, in Lithuania academic contracts 
are initially for five years, and are twice renewed before an indefinite contract is offered, so staff 
will need to have been employed for 15 years before tenure is possible; even then, tenured staff 
are still subject to five yearly evaluations, with the prospect of redundancy following a poor 
evaluation. A similar system (tenure after an initial five yearly contract with two reappointments) 
operates in Croatia, although once receiving tenure, academics acquire the status of public 
servants.  Many EU nations (Austria, Germany, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, and 
Poland) offer tenured posts but require applicants to have a habilitation (post-doctoral lecturing 
qualification) as a pre-requisite for tenured professorial posts. Consequently, research staff in 
these nations who do not undertake teaching are often only offered fixed appointment posts.  
Tenure is still strong, however, in countries like France, in which staff can apply for a permanent 
position as Maître de Conférences, after earning their doctoral degree.  Such a position is 
generally considered a permanent position as a civil servant, with all the ensuing advantages. To 
proceed beyond this, applicants are required to earn a habilitation de diriger des recherches, 
which corresponds to the habilitation in other higher education systems. Once applicants have 
attained the habilitation, they can apply for a full professorship.  
Following reforms initiated in the last decade, some nations have altered the provision of tenure 
and the mode of governance.  The 2009 Universities Act in Finland, for example, made 
universities corporate entities, and ended the system whereby professorial and other academic 
had contracts with the state (i.e. academics were civil servants), and inaugurated a new system in 
which academic staff were employed on contracts with their individual universities.  At the same 
time the governance system was altered, and the power of Rector increased. In Finland, and 
elsewhere, universities that once had probation style tenure schemes, or a system based on 
habilitation, having now acquired additional employment and contractual powers (under the 
convenient soubriquet of “institutional autonomy”), are now starting to institute new career paths 
based on a system of “tenure track” positions (i.e. fixed-term contracts advertised with the 
prospect of a tenured, permanent, position at a higher level, subject to positive evaluation, but 
without renewed advertising of, and application for, the next position), as are operated in  
universities in the USA. Sciewer and Jehle47 have identified “tenure track” systems in Belgium (KU 
Leuven), Finland (University of Helsinki), Germany (University of Freiburg, LMU Munich, 
University of Heidelberg), Italy (University of Milan), the Netherlands (Universities of Amsterdam, 
Leiden, Utrecht), and Sweden (University of Lund); it seems likely that such schemes will become 
more widespread in the future.  Currently, academics in the universities of the EU states do have 
legally protected employment rights which are not enjoyed by their counterparts in the UK.  
However, changes to tenure protection in nations like Finland have taken place in recent years, 
and are likely to accelerate, with consequent deleterious effects on the employment rights of 
those concerned. Even if, as is likely, the employment contracts in nations like Italy and Sweden, 
move towards a “tenure-track” system like that used in the USA, nevertheless people on such 
contracts will enjoy greater employment rights than are available to their counterparts in the UK. 
 
                                                 
47 H. Schiewer and C. Jehle, (2014) Tenure and Tenure Track at LERU Universities: Models for Attractive Research 
Careers in Europe, Leuven: LERU, p.11 
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7 International Protection for Academic Freedom 
As has been shown, the central importance of academic freedom to universities has been 
recognised in the majority of the national constitutions and legislations of the individual E.U. 
countries.  In addition to these national legal safeguards, protection also occurs at supra national 
level.  Hence, the E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights, which includes the declaration that “The 
arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint. Academic freedom shall be respected”48 
was incorporated into the 2008 E.U. Revision Treaty.49  Similarly, at the Assembly debate on 30th 
June 2006, the 47 members of the Council of Europe approved a Recommendation on Academic 
Freedom and University Autonomy and exhorted the Council’s Committee of Ministers to 
“strengthen its work on academic freedom and university autonomy as a fundamental requirement 
of any democratic society”.50 
However the most detailed such recommendation was issued in 1997 by UNESCO which affirmed 
that “the right to education, teaching and research can only be fully enjoyed in an atmosphere of 
academic freedom ... the open communication of findings, hypotheses and opinions lies at the 
very heart of higher education and provides the strongest guarantee of the accuracy and 
objectivity of scholarship and research”.51  The Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-
Education Teaching Personnel, which was adopted by the UNESCO General Conference in 
November 1997, was the result of extensive consultation with academic and legal experts, NGOs 
including the International Labour Organisation, and with member states. The Recommendation is 
not a stand-alone document but is well-embedded in other international regulations - as Beiter 
points out “in its preamble the Recommendation refers to article 26 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights ... article 13(2)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, to the Convention against Discrimination in Education, (and) to the UNESCO/International 
Labour Organisation Recommendation concerning the status of teachers”.52  Subsequently 
UNESCO increased the responsibilities of the Committee of Experts on the Application of the 
Recommendation concerning Teaching Personnel (CEART) to include monitoring of the 
implementation of the 1997 Recommendation. Legal instruments such as the UNESCO 
Recommendation have the judicial status of “soft law” which, Hillgenberg advises, are often 
concluded “because the states involved do not want a full-fledged treaty which, in the event of 
non-fulfilment, would result in a breach of international law”.53  However the Director-General of 
UNESCO has argued that in UNESCO’s case: “Although recommendations are not binding on 
Member States, in the same way as conventions that have been ratified by them, it is the 
underlying idea of common solutions to common problems that usually leads to the incorporation 
of their principles and precepts into national legislation”.54 
                                                 
48 European Union (2000) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 18th December 2000, p. 11. 
49 European Union (2008) Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union Official Journal of the European Union Volume 51, 2008/C 115/01,  Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the E.U., p. 337. 
50 Council of Europe (2006) Recommendation 1762: Academic Freedom and University Autonomy, 30th June 2006. 
51 UNESCO (1997) Records of the General Conference, Twenty-ninth Session Paris, 21 October to 12 November 1997, 
Volume 1 Resolutions, Paris: UNESCO, p. 26. 
52 K. Beiter, (2005) The Protection of the Right to Education by International Law, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, p. 278. 
53 H. Hillgenberg, (1999) “A Fresh Look at Soft Law”, European Journal of International Law, 10(3): 504. 
54 K. Matsuura, (2007) “Forward” in A. Yusuf (ed.) Standard-setting in UNESCO Vol. I: Normative Action in Education, 
Science and Culture Essays in Commemoration of the Sixtieth Anniversary of UNESCO, Paris/Leiden: UNESCO 
publishing/Martinus Nijhoff, p. 12. 
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UNESCO’s Recommendation was the first international attempt to provide a detailed description 
of the necessary parameters for academic freedom, seek international support for their 
implementation, and provide a mode of redress (via reports to the CEART). The Recommendation 
specifies the following major critical elements which are considered crucial to academic freedom: 
• Institutional Autonomy - “that degree of self-governance necessary for effective decision 
making by institutions of higher education regarding their academic work, standards, 
management and related activities” (para 17). 
• Individual rights and freedoms - “the principle of academic freedom should be scrupulously 
observed. Higher-education teaching personnel are entitled to the maintaining of academic 
freedom, that is to say, the right, without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of 
teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing 
the results thereof, freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in 
which they work, freedom from institutional censorship and freedom to participate in 
professional or representative academic bodies”. (para 27). 
• Self-governance and collegiality - “Higher-education teaching personnel should have the right 
and opportunity, ... to take part in the governing bodies ... while respecting the right of other 
sections of the academic community to participate, and they should also have the right to 
elect a majority of representatives to academic bodies within the higher education institution. 
... Collegial decision-making should encompass decisions regarding the administration and 
determination of policies of higher education, curricula, research, extension work, the 
allocation of resources and other related activities” (para 31, 32). 
• Tenure – “Tenure or its functional equivalent, where applicable, should be safeguarded as far 
as possible even when changes in the organization of or within a higher education institution 
or system are made, and should be granted, after a reasonable period of probation, to those 
who meet stated objective criteria in teaching, and/or scholarship, and/or research to the 
satisfaction of an academic body”, (para. 46). 
In 2009 Karran undertook a macro-level analysis of the degree of compliance with these elements 
by the constitution and legislative instruments in each of the (then) 27 EU states.55 The legislative 
data was examined to see whether or not it was in compliance with the UNESCO 
Recommendation by addressing the following questions:  
Are the universities legally autonomous? 
Is academic freedom protected either in the constitution or in law?  
Do the academic staff elect the majority of representatives to academic decision making bodies?  
Does academic tenure exist? 
For some countries, the legislation was unequivocal - for example Article 17: 6 of the Greek 
Constitution guarantees tenure by stating: “Professors of university level institutions shall not be 
dismissed prior to the lawful termination of their term of service, except in the cases of the 
substantive conditions provided by article 88 paragraph 4 and following a decision by a council 
constituted in its majority of highest judicial functionaries, as specified by law”. Similarly, but in 
stark contrast, paragraph 203 of the U.K. 1988 Education Reform Act had the purpose of 
“securing that the statutes of each qualifying (h.e.) institution include a provision enabling an 
                                                 
55 T. Karran, (2009b) “Academic Freedom in Europe: Reviewing UNESCO's Recommendation”, British Journal of 
Educational Studies, 57(2): 191–215. 
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appropriate body, … to dismiss any member of the academic staff by reason of redundancy”.  
However, in other states (such as Spain), tenure is offered following some form of competition but 
may be subject to periodic review, hence the nation concerned can be said to be in qualified 
rather than absolute compliance with the UNESCO Recommendation.  Similarly, in Finland, 
academic staff are not in the majority on the University Board, but all members of the university 
board are appointed by the University Senate, which suggests qualified compliance with the 
UNESCO Recommendation on academic governance, as the majority of board members are 
either elected from, or appointed by, the academic staff.  In addition, difficulties in adjudging 
compliance arise from the UNESCO Recommendation sometimes lacking clarity – for example 
paragraph 18 states that “the nature of institutional autonomy may vary according to the type of 
establishment involved” (but fails to specify what is required for compliance), while paragraph 46 
states that “Security of employment in the profession, including tenure or its functional equivalent, 
where applicable, should be safeguarded” (my emphasis).  For these reasons, on the basis of the 
relevant legislation, each nation was adjudged to be in compliance, qualified compliance, or 
non-compliance with the UNESCO Recommendation’s four critical elements.  The different 
nations were then ranked in accordance with their degree of compliance with the four elements of 
the UNESCO Recommendation, and the results are shown in Table 4 below (the Appendix Tables 
contain illustrative examples demonstrating the approach on pages 35-37). 
As can be seen in the top half of the table, only 7 of the (then) 27 EU states were fully compliant 
with all four elements, and ranked below them were a further 8 nations which were compliant with 
three elements, and in qualified compliance with the fourth. Interestingly, it is notable that this 
largely compliant cohort includes those states which have, until relatively recently, been under 
totalitarian control (e.g. Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, etc.).  These nations have only recently re-
written their constitutions and their higher education legislation, and it is possible that their 
experiences of undemocratic rule have led them to better appreciate the benefits of academic 
freedom, both to the higher education sector, and society at large.  Nevertheless in the majority of 
states, there is either complete or qualified compliance with the majority of UNESCO’s 
Recommendation.   
At the bottom of the table is the UK, in which compliance exists with respect to autonomy – all 
pre-1992 universities have their autonomy protected by their royal charters, while the post-1992 
institutions are designated as higher education corporations.  However the UK is non-compliant 
with respect to protecting academic freedom in law, and also with respect to a majoritarian role for 
academic staff in governance, while tenure was abolished in the UK, nearly a decade before the 
UNESCO Recommendation was signed by Clair Short, the (then) Secretary of State for 
International Development, on behalf of the UK government. 
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Table 4: UNESCO “Top Down” Analysis: Summary Table 
Nation 
Are the 
institutions legally 
autonomous? 
Is academic freedom 
protected either in the 
constitution or in law? 
Do the academic staff 
elect the majority of 
representatives to 
decision making bodies? 
Does academic 
tenure exist? 
Bulgaria Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance 
Czech 
Republic 
Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance 
Finland Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance 
Greece Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance 
Poland Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance 
Slovenia Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance 
Spain Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance 
Hungary Compliance Qualified Compliance Compliance Compliance 
Ireland Compliance Compliance Qualified Compliance Compliance 
Italy Compliance Compliance Compliance Qualified Compliance 
Latvia Compliance Compliance Compliance Qualified Compliance 
Lithuania Compliance Compliance Compliance Qualified Compliance 
Portugal Compliance Qualified Compliance Compliance Compliance 
Romania Compliance Qualified Compliance Compliance Compliance 
Slovakia Compliance Compliance Compliance Qualified Compliance 
Austria Compliance Compliance Qualified Compliance Qualified Compliance 
Belgium Compliance Qualified compliance Qualified Compliance Compliance 
Estonia Compliance Qualified Compliance Compliance Qualified Compliance 
France Compliance Compliance Non Compliance Qualified Compliance 
Sweden Compliance Qualified Compliance Non Compliance Compliance 
Germany Compliance Qualified Compliance Qualified Compliance Qualified Compliance 
Luxembourg Compliance Qualified Compliance Qualified Compliance Qualified Compliance 
Netherlands Compliance Qualified Compliance Non Compliance Qualified Compliance 
Cyprus Non Compliance Qualified compliance Non Compliance Compliance 
Malta Compliance Non Compliance Qualified Compliance Non Compliance 
Denmark Non Compliance Qualified Compliance Non Compliance Qualified Compliance 
U.K. Compliance Non Compliance Non Compliance Non Compliance 
 
The method adopted in this 2009 study was very simple to apply, as it was a ‘top-down’ approach 
utilising single benchmarks for individual elements. Consequently, it did not address other 
significant international agreements and their operation across the EU countries, or the technical 
minutiae of national legislation, and the operation of such laws in individual EU states. Moreover 
this approach only enables individual states to be compared (and ranked) with each other, with 
respect to their protection for academic freedom, thus the measures derived can be described as 
nominal or ordinal. In essence, this approach was norm referenced, and could enable an 
assessment of whether the protection for academic freedom in one nation is greater than that in 
another. However, this approach does not allow the derivation of individual scores, which would 
show how closely a nation comes to meeting all its commitments, or whether the level of 
protection over time has altered, as this could only be undertaken with an interval measurement 
and criterion referencing. Such an interval measure, derived from a ‘bottom up’ approach which 
embraces a wide set of criterion referenced parameters, would make it possible to see (for 
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example) if any nation scored 100% in terms of its protection for academic freedom, or show how 
the level of protection in individual nations has altered over time, or what the average score was 
for a group of nations, which was not possible with the previous nominal norm-referenced 
measure. 
To overcome these problems, a new ‘bottom up’ analysis56 was attempted which includes the 
measures utilized in previous studies, such as (for example) the granting of tenure but also 
utilises additional international and inter-related measures, and thereby provides a much clearer 
and richer picture of the legal protection for academic freedom within the contemporary European 
Union states. For example, previous studies examined the process of appointing the Rector, but 
did not examine the process for dismissing the Rector, or the staff input into 
appointment/dismissal procedures for middle managers (Deans and Departmental Heads). This 
new study addresses these elements but also examined (inter alia) whether or not collegial bodies 
(like Senate) are legislated for and, if so, how are they composed; moreover, if these bodies exist, 
what is their role in determining university strategy. Furthermore, this subsequent study includes 
an additional important dimension - the ratification by EU states of international agreements that 
are supportive of the protection of academic freedom 
Previous analyses have examined compliance with the UNESCO Recommendation, but did not 
include other international legal instruments. This broader analysis includes the following 
European and International legal instruments. At European level, the European Convention on 
Human Rights offers indirect protection, as Article 10 specifies that “Everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression”.57  At global level, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) was adopted in December 1966, and provides “the right to hold opinions without 
interference” and “the right to freedom of expression”. Both these rights can be seen to be 
necessary (though not sufficient) for academic freedom. Article 2 of the same Covenant requires 
that “each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant” and that “each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary 
steps, ... to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant”.58  Assessing Article 2, Sepúlveda concludes that “the duties 
to ‘respect’ and ‘ensure’ ... imply ... the duty to take positive actions necessary to ensure those 
rights”.59  Hence the ICCPR, like the 1st Amendment of the US Constitution on freedom of 
speech, protects academic freedom indirectly, while becoming a party to the Convenant by states 
who are not yet compliant, imposes on them the duty to introduce legislation to achieve 
compliance. The Optional Protocol to the ICCPR established an individual complaints mechanism 
for the ICCPR, under which parties agree to recognise the competence of the UN Human Rights 
Committee to consider complaints from individuals who claim that their rights under the Covenant 
have been violated. 
                                                 
56 The measures described in this section of the report are taken from: Terence Karran, Klaus Beiter, Kwado Appiagyei-
Atua, “Measuring Academic Freedom in Europe: A Criterion Referenced Approach” forthcoming in Policy Reviews in 
Higher Education. 
57 European Court of Human Rights, (2010) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, (as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13), Strasbourg: 
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58 United Nations, (1966) “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 993, 
No. 14668, New York: UN, p. 178, 173 
59 M. Sepúlveda, (2003) The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Antwerp: Intersentia, p. 126. 
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The second international Covenant included in this broader appraisal is the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social Cultural Rights (ICESCR) also adopted in 1966. Article 15(3) calls 
on nations to “respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity”.60 
Moreover, in General Comment 3 (paragraph 10) the ICESCR states: “a minimum core obligation 
to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is 
incumbent upon every State party. ... If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to 
establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d’être”. 
Academic freedom is considered a core obligation under the right to education (Article 13) - in 
General Comment 13: Right to Education, the ICESCR states: “it is appropriate and necessary for 
the Committee to make some observations about academic freedom. .... Academic freedom 
includes the liberty of individuals to express freely opinions about the institution or system in 
which they work, to fulfil their functions without discrimination or fear of repression by the State or 
any other actor, to participate in professional or representative academic bodies, and to enjoy all 
the internationally recognized human rights applicable to other individuals in the same 
jurisdiction”. The Committee adds, “violations of article 13 include … the denial of academic 
freedom of staff and students” (para. 59). In terms of implementation, the ICESCR (article 2(1)) 
requires a state to “take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures”.61   
Hence the ICESCR firstly, recognises academic freedom as a core obligation, and secondly 
requires states’ parties to adopt legislative measures to recognise this right. As with the ICCPR, 
the ICESCR’s Optional Protocol creates an individual complaints mechanism to consider 
complaints from individuals or groups who claim that their rights under the Covenant have been 
violated. In toto this ‘bottom up’ measurement method utilizes a total of 37 different legislative 
elements (these are shown in detail in Table 5 below) for each EU nation state which enables the 
calculation of a composite measure of the legal protection for academic freedom out of 100%, and 
comprises the sum of the scores for five dimensions, each worth 20%. These dimensions are: 
academic freedom for teaching and for research; institutional autonomy; self-governance; 
academic tenure; and adherence to international agreements.   
The scores for the five elements and the overall score are given in Table 6 below. 
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Table 5: Measures used for Composite “Bottom-Up” Analysis 
Description of Measure % Weighting 
Measure (1): Legal and Constitutional Protection for teaching and research 20 
Measure (2): Legal and Constitutional provision for institutional autonomy 4 
Composite Measure: Internal operation of autonomy: 8 
(3) Rector’s Appointment  1 
(4) Internal Structures 1 
(5) State Funding 1 
(6) Commissioned Research 1 
(7) Staff Appointments 2 
(8) Student Recruitment 1 
(9) Degree Accreditation 1 
Measure (10): State regulation of university autonomy 4 
Measure (11): Private sector constraints on autonomy 4 
Measure (12): Legal provision for self-governance: 2 
Composite Measure: Operational self-governance: 12 
(13) Existence of Collegial Bodies 1 
(14) Composition of Collegial Bodies 2 
(15) Composition of Senate 3 
(16) Strategic Decision Making 6 
Composite Measure: Staff powers of appointment and dismissal 6 
(17) Dean’s/Head of Department’s Credentials 1 
(18) Appointing the Dean/Head of Department 1 
(19) Dismissing the Dean/Head of Department 1 
(20) Rector’s Credentials 1 
(21) Appointing the Rector 1 
(22) Dismissing the Rector 1 
Composite Measure: Protection for academic tenure and promotion:  20 
(23) De jure Protection: Duration of contracts 4 
(24) De facto protection: Duration of contracts 4 
(25) Provision for contract termination in h.e. legislation  3 
(26) Provision for contract termination in other legislation 3 
(27) The provision for academic advancement 6 
Composite Measure: Constitutional protection for academic freedom 10 
(28) Provision on freedom of speech 2 
(29) Provision on academic freedom 2 
(30) Reference to institutional autonomy 1 
(31) Reference to self-governance 1 
(32) Robustness of provisions 4 
Composite Measure: International protection for academic freedom 10 
(33) ICCPR (free speech provision) 1.5 
(34) OP-ICCPR (complaints procedure before UN) 1.5 
(35) ICESCR (right to education provision) 1.5 
(36) OP-ICESCR (complaints procedure before UN) 1.5 
(37) ECHR (free speech provision) 4 
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Table 6: “Bottom-Up” Analysis: Summary Table of Results 
Nation Total 
Academic 
Freedom in 
Legislation 
Institutional 
Autonomy in 
Legislation 
Self-
Governance in 
Legislation 
Job 
Security 
Constitution & 
International 
Agreements 
Croatia 69.0 20.0 13.0 14.0 4.5 17.5 
Spain 66.5 15.0 8.5 12.0 11.0 20.0 
Bulgaria 65.5 15.0 9.0 14.5 9.5 17.5 
Germany  64.5 17.5 9.25 12.25 8.0 17.5 
Austria 63.5 20.0 12.0 9.0 5.0 17.5 
France 63.0 20.0 7.0 6.5 15.5 14.0 
Portugal 61.0 10.0 9.0 11.5 10.5 20.0 
Slovakia 60.5 20.0 8.5 12.5 1.5 18.0 
Latvia 60.0 20.0 10.0 10.5 3.0 16.5 
Lithuania 59.5 20.0 11.0 6.0 5.0 17.5 
Italy 57.5 10.0 9.0 8.0 11.5 19.0 
Greece 55.5 5.0 4.5 10.5 20.0 15.5 
Finland 55.0 15.0 15.0 3.0 3.0 19.0 
Poland 54.5 10.0 9.5 12.5 5.0 17.5 
Romania 53.5 15.0 8.0 12.5 5.5 12.5 
Cyprus 53.0 10.0 8.0 12.5 10.0 12.5 
Ireland 52.5 15.0 12.5 3.0 10.5 11.5 
Slovenia 52.5 5.0 8.5 11.0 10.5 17.5 
Czech Republic 51.5 15.0 8.0 11.0 2.0 15.5 
Belgium  49.25 10.0 8.5 7.5 9.25 14.0 
Luxemburg 47.5 15.0 9.0 6.0 3.5 14.0 
Netherlands 44.0 10.0 9.0 5.5 3.5 12.5 
Sweden 39.5 5.0 6.5 3.0 8.5 16.5 
Denmark 38.5 5.0 9.0 6.5 5.5 12.5 
Hungary 36.0 5.0 2.5 9.0 8.0 11.5 
Malta 36.0 0.0 10.5 6.0 8.5 11.0 
U.K. 35.0 5.0 13.5 0.0 5.5 11.0 
Estonia 34.0 0.0 10.5 4.5 1.5 17.5 
Mean (St Dev) 52.8 (10.5) 11.9 (6.3) 9.3 (2.6) 8.6 (3.9) 7.3 (4.3) 15.6 (2.9) 
 
This study is the most comprehensive and concise attempt to measure the de jure protection for 
academic freedom in the EU states, encompassing very detailed data from constitutions, 
legislative instruments and international agreements. The previous study, utilising the UNESCO 
framework, showed some that nations which had not long emerged from totalitarian rule (the ex-
USSR and Warsaw Pact nations and Spain), tended to score higher than the other EU nations. 
This new analysis shows no discernible pattern between the nations in this group, or possible 
patterns between states that might be considered to have some symmetry owing to shared 
history, such as (inter alia) the Nordic states in the sample. Nevertheless, the ranking of the EU 
nations shows some symmetry with the previous study in which (for example) both Denmark and 
the UK languished near the bottom of the table. The UK has an aggregate score of 35%, which 
compares with an EU average of 52.8%, and is virtually half that of Croatia, which sits at the top 
of the table with 69%. Indeed, the data in this table for the UK is consistent with all those tables 
previously used, in that it shows the UK to be, yet, again, among the worst nations in Europe with 
respect to the de jure protection for academic freedom. In the rest of the report the de facto 
protection is assessed. 
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8 The UCU Academic Freedom Survey  
In 2013, the lead author was awarded an EU funded two year research grant of €299,558.40 to 
bring a Research Fellow, Dr. Klaus Beiter, to the University of Lincoln to undertake a study of 
academic freedom in the European Union. A major plank of this work was the creation of an on-
line survey on academic freedom.  This survey was piloted in the University of Lincoln, which 
enabled possible problems to be eliminated.  The corrected survey was then made available for 
online completion via the Survey-Monkey website. The survey had four sections: Academic 
Freedom in your Department/Faculty, Institution and Nation (15 questions); Your Personal 
Experiences of Direct Challenges to Academic Freedom (14 questions); Some Questions About 
You (22 questions); About Your Academic Work and Responsibilities (18 questions). Using an 
online survey delivered via Survey-Monkey in this way has various distinct advantages:62 
• it can reach a large number of intended participants very easily; 
• it expedites the data collection process, as respondents can fill in the survey from a remote 
server;  
• data is collected on a remote server and so guarantees anonymity, which complied with the 
EU ethical guidelines and requirements for the research; 
• the Survey-Monkey website provides various analytical tools for generating frequencies for 
each question; 
• participants’ responses can be automatically stored in a database, which means that the data 
can be downloaded using excel or exported into SPSS, thus eliminating the task of manually 
inputting each individual data sheet, and the coding of a large number of questionnaires; 
• in terms of time and money, this method is quick and highly cost effective.  
Once the survey was ready, a personal printed letter was sent to the Rector of every university in 
all of the EU states, explaining the purpose of the study, indicating the URL to enable the survey 
to be completed online, and requesting that an email be sent to all academic staff members at 
their institution, inviting them to complete the survey.  Subsequently, contact was made with 
Education International, a global union federation of teachers' trade unions comprising 401 
member organisations in 172 countries and which represents over 32 million education personnel, 
and to which the majority of higher educational trade unions and professional associations, such 
as the UCU, belong.  Educational International agreed to send a letter to all their h.e. member 
organisations in the EU, explaining the purpose of the study, indicating the URL to enable the 
survey to be completed online, and requesting that an email be sent to all academic members of 
their respective organisations, with a request to complete the survey. Finally, websites of the 
largest universities in each EU nation were used to identify the names and email addresses of all 
academic staff, who were then sent a personal email, inviting them to participate in the survey. 
This work is still ongoing, to try to increase the response rate in the smaller EU states. At present 
the total number of responses to the European survey exceeds 5300, of which circa 500 are from 
the United Kingdom. The sample size is such that, it represents an accurate snap-shot of the 
state of academic freedom in the majority of EU states, and can therefore act as a good 
comparator against which to bench mark the equivalent data obtained from UCU staff in the UK. 
The success of this survey, as a research instrument for gathering data, was such that it made 
sense to adopt a similar approach, albeit with bespoke elements, to gather data from UCU 
members.  Consequently, after discussions with Rob Copeland (UCU Policy Officer) and Matt 
                                                 
62 For a comparison of the relative merits of using email and web-based surveys, when compared with postal surveys and 
face-to-face and telephone interviews, see A. Bryman, (2016) Social Research Methods, (5th Ed.). Oxford: OUP, p. 236  
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Waddup (UCU's Head of Policy and Campaigns), it was decided to retain the basic structure of 
the previous survey, but in a slimmed down form, by removing some questions that were less 
relevant to the British context, as it was thought that this would help to increase the response rate. 
Furthermore, some of the questions were slightly re-formatted, while others were added to reflect 
the British context (for example, on ethnicity), and also to address the UCU’s ongoing work and 
policy concerns in this area. Response rates can be influenced by questionnaire design, 
readability, layout and length,63 as well as time constraints, bad timing, work load and low 
respondent motivation.64  Hence, as with the European survey, these were all taken into 
consideration in the UCU study as far as possible. In addition, it was agreed that people 
completing the survey would have the chance to have their names and email addresses entered 
into prize draw, with the possibility of winning John Lewis vouchers worth £100, as previous 
studies65 had shown that such strategies can increase survey response rates. 
The resultant questionnaire, like the previous European survey, had four sections as follows: 
Section A - Academic Freedom in your Department/Faculty and your Institution (10 questions); 
Section B - Your Personal Experiences of Direct Challenges to Academic Freedom (12 
questions); Section C - Some Questions About You (15 questions);  Section D - Union 
Membership and Any Other Comments (3 questions). (The on-line survey appears in the 
Appendix Tables, on pages 38-56) Once completed and approved, the survey was uploaded onto 
the Survey-Gizmo website, for which UCU has a subscription. Survey Gizmo has comparable 
functionality and similar advantages to those described for Survey Monkey above. The survey 
was launched on December 14th 2016, when the following email was sent to all UCU members: 
Dear Colleague, 
The UCU’s Education Committee is undertaking research into the current status of, and 
protection for, academic freedom in UK higher education, with a view to making a report to the 
UCU Congress in 2017.  
We are working with Professor Terence Karran (University of Lincoln) on this issue, including a 
survey of members’ personal experience regarding the protection of academic freedom.  
Your views are crucial to the union's ongoing work on improving the protection for academic 
freedom. So, please help us by filling in the short survey here:  
 https://www.surveygizmo.com/s3/3222927/Academic-Freedom 
Yours faithfully,  
Sally Hunt, UCU General Secretary 
This initial email resulted in 1470 responses by 5th January 2017 and, on 12th January 2017, a 
reminder email was sent to UCU members.  This had the effect of increasing the number of 
responses substantially, such that when it was decided to close the survey, in order to analyse the 
data, there were 2340 responses from UCU members. As Sánchez-Fernández et al., point out, 
the use of web-based surveys has “experienced phenomenal growth in recent years” and, despite 
the expectations that such surveys would surpass those of traditional survey methods (such as 
postal or telephone surveys), response rates have instead “fallen in an alarming manner”. They 
ascribe this fall, at least in part, to the “excessive number of surveys that individuals are requested 
                                                 
63 W. Schofield, (2006) “Survey Sampling”, in Sapsford, R., and Jupp, V., (eds.) Data Collection and Analysis. 2nd edition 
London: Sage/OUP, 26-55 
64 A. Oppenheim, (2000) Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement, London: Continuum, 103-8. 
65 K. Ralston, R. Connelly, S. Murray, C. Playford, (2010) “Methods in Survey Design to Improve Response Rates: A 
Review of the Empirical Evidence”, School of Applied Social Science Working Paper, University of Edinburgh. 
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to complete”.66 The number of requests to complete web-based surveys received by academics 
(from the UCU and elsewhere) is possibly a reason for the (relatively) modest response to the 
survey.  During the week in which the first email was sent out advising UCU members about the 
academic freedom survey, they also received emails, from the UCU, requesting them to complete 
surveys on other subjects; moreover, the proximity of the Christmas holidays may also have had 
an impact in damping down the initial response rate. 
Measured against the 104,285 membership of the UCU, the response rate of 2340 seems 
relatively low.  However, the membership includes not only h.e academics, and f.e. lecturers, but 
also (inter alia) trainers, instructors, researchers, managers, administrators, computer staff, 
librarians and postgraduates in universities, colleges, prisons, adult education and training 
organisations across the UK.  Within the total membership of 104285, 78058 were employed as 
Academics, Lecturers or Tutors.  It is this group for whom academic freedom is crucially important 
in enabling them to successfully undertake their academic, scholastic and research duties. 
Although it is impossible to check, it is likely that other UCU members, who may have received an 
invitation but who work as librarians, or in learning support or computing, would be less likely to 
complete the survey, as they may perceive academic freedom to be less relevant to their job 
roles.  Data cleaning to remove responses with insufficient completion rates (deemed to be <75% 
survey completion) resulted in the exclusion of 5 responses and a final dataset of 2335. 
Statistically, a sample of circa 2330 would be required in order to make meaningful statements 
about a population sized 78058, with a 2% margin of error with a 95% confidence level.  In this 
instance the actual response for the survey was 2335, i.e. just above this threshold value.  
Margins of error refer to the plus-or-minus figure usually reported in newspaper opinion poll 
results. For example, if a margin of error of 2% is used and 47% percent of the sample picks an 
answer, you can be “sure” that if you had asked the question to the entire population, between 
45% (47-2) and 49% (47+2) would have picked that answer. The confidence level indicates the 
certainty of the margin of error.  It is expressed as a percentage and represents how often the true 
percentage of the population who would pick an answer that lies within the margin of error.  With a 
95% confidence level, there is 1 chance in 20 that we would get a false positive result.  In this 
analysis, the significance level for the tests was set at 5%; however, where the significance of a 
statistical test is greater than 5% (for example, where it is 1%), this will be reported.  The decision 
to use a 5% (as opposed to a 1% or 10% significance level) is arbitrary but as Gall et al.67 and 
Cowles and Davis,68 report, a 5% significance level is invariably used in studies of this kind, and 
across the social sciences. 
Similarly, the statistical tests that are routinely employed in this study (ANOVA and Chi Square) 
are habitually used in analyses of social data of this kind. As required for the different questions in 
the survey, One-way ANOVA tests were carried out to determine the F statistic and the statistical 
significance of the difference between the means of the two independent groups, that is, between 
the UCU members and the EU academics.  As appropriate, following Salkind,69 ANOVA was used 
to compare the mean values of variables of the two independent (UCU and EU) samples.  In line 
with standard statistical practice, the null hypothesis is accepted if there is no statistical difference 
                                                 
66 J. Sánchez-Fernández, F. Muñoz-Leiva, F. Montoro-Ríos, (2012) “Improving retention rate and response quality in Web-
based surveys”, Computers in Human Behavior, 28(2): 507 
67 M. Gall, J. Gall, & W. Borg, (2007) Educational research: An introduction,  Boston, MA: Pearson Education 
68 M. Cowles & C. Davis, (1982) “On the origins of the .05 level of statistical significance”, American Psychologist, 37(5) 
553-558 
69 N. Salkind, (2004) “Two groups too many? Try analysis of variance”, in (eds.) L. Shaw, M. Crouppen, D. Axelsen, & L. 
Lech, Statistics for people who think they hate statistics, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc, pp. 193-211. 
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between the two means of the two groups, where p > 0.05.  The null hypothesis is rejected if p < 
0.05.  ANOVA does have limitations, in that it assumes that the variables are normally distributed.  
Despite this limitation, ANOVA can still be used even if the data is not normally distributed, as it is 
not very sensitive to moderate deviations from normality.  Studies by Harwell et al.70 and Lix et 
al.71 have shown that results, using a variety of non-normal distributions, were not affected very 
much by this violation of the assumption of normality. Hence in this analysis, standard ANOVA 
techniques will be used; where the underlying assumptions of the ANOVA test are jeopardized, 
recourse will be made to Welch’s correction,72 which has been shown by Tomarken and Serlin73 to 
be most effective.  Additionally, where appropriate, the non-parametric Chi Squared test has been 
employed in this study.  An advantage of Chi-Square over One-way ANOVA is that whereas the 
One-way ANOVA is based on the comparison of means between the two independent groups, 
Chi-Square compares the actual counts within the categories and compares this with the 
expected data that would be obtained according to a specific hypothesis.  This test was 
appropriate to analyse categorical data where data had been counted and divided into categories 
according to the two groups, UCU and EU respondents.  As necessary, the Chi-Square test was 
used to compare responses of the two groups to individual questions thereby determining whether 
there exists a significant difference between the groups for categorical variables.  As some 
respondents deliberately omitted some questions, the sample may be subject to slight variation 
between questions. However, in sum, the statistical techniques used in this study, and the setting 
of the relevant parameters (sample size, confidence levels, etc.) are in line with standard social 
science research practice.  The data gathered by the survey will be addressed in accordance with 
the differing sections of the survey used to gather it. 
 
9 Academic Freedom in Respondents’ Departments, Faculties and Institutions 
The data from the UCU survey, and also from the European survey (less the responses from the 
UK, to avoid any possibility of double counting) were combined in one large ‘working’ Excel 
dataset file, which was then input into SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) and 
used for all the statistical tests.  SPSS is habitually used in social analyses of this kind, not only in 
academia, but also in business; for example, it is used by insurance companies to calculate 
mortality rates and assess insurance risks.  The first part of the survey looked at academic 
freedom at institutional and departmental levels. 
Question 1 was a free text question which asked: From your own perspective, please write in the 
comment box below what academic freedom means to you.  This question was designed to 
provide an easy introduction to the survey and explicitly demonstrate that we wished to hear what 
people had to say on the topic.  2204 respondents answered this question, generating a huge 
volume of text (76,000 words).  Constraints of time made it impossible to analyse this textual data 
in any meaningful way, however, Table 7 shows the first ten such comments by way of illustration, 
and the full data is available for scrutiny (on request) on pages 57-164 of the Appendix Tables. To 
protect the identity of some respondents, their comments were abridged and/or anonymised.  
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73 A. Tomarken, & R. Serlin, (1986) ‘Comparison of ANOVA alternatives under variance heterogeneity and specific 
noncentrality structures’, Psychological Bulletin, 99(1): 90-99 
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Table 7: Example of Comments: “What Does Academic Freedom Mean to You? 
Response 
The freedom to express opinions, pose theories or hypotheses and investigate issues without constraints. 
That my University will uphold and not ride roughshod over its own Statutes, which should protect the right of 
an academic to challenge established wisdom, and propose controversial and unpopular ideas, without fear 
of disciplinary action. I have first-hand experience that this is not the case in my University. 
The ability to undertake scholarly work or public/scholarly dissemination of that work on any topic of your 
choosing, without institutional censorship. 
Freedom to do self-directed research 
The right, without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in 
carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof, freedom to express freely their 
opinion about the institution or system in which they work, freedom from institutional censorship and freedom 
to participate in professional or representative academic bodies. 
The right to express my views through whatever medium, my views on what I believe to be right on the basis 
of evidence I have my opinions either on my academic subject or any subject of my choosing.  
The freedom to research and attempt to publish any areas I feel, as an academic, are worthy of research 
without implicit or explicit pressure to cease, amend, or overlook the relevant findings. 
Freedom to research what I find interesting and rewarding for both me and society without being constrained 
by the current paradigm. 
The freedom to pursue and present research untrammelled by commercial or political considerations or the 
whims of fashion. 
That I can structure and determine the content of modules for which I'm given responsibility; that I can 
undertake and publish research in my field without the direction of that research being dictated by any other 
party 
 
Question 2: Does the institution in which you work have an official policy documents outlining the 
protection for academic freedom? 
Table 8 below provides the breakdown of responses for question 2.  As can be seen, only 15% of 
respondents, in both the UCU and the EU cohorts, knew that there was an official policy 
document for academic freedom in their institutions.  The relative numbers of respondents 
reporting that no such document existed in their university demonstrate that the existence of such 
documents is less pervasive in the EU nations, than in the UK.  One possible reason for this could 
lie in the fact that, as was demonstrated in the earlier report on de jure protection, there is 
stronger constitutional and legal protection for academic freedom in the EU nations than in the 
UK; hence institutional documents may be unnecessary. What is startling about the figures in the 
table is the general level of ignorance, in both groups (but which is particularly marked in the UK), 
concerning whether their institution had an official policy document relating to academic freedom.  
Given the assumed importance of academic freedom, it is surprising that 7 out of 10 UK 
academics who responded to this question had no idea whether or not their university had a 
policy on academic freedom.  The profile of responses displayed in table 1, and the resultant Chi 
Squared statistic, demonstrates that the differences in the responses between the UCU and EU 
cohorts are statistically significant. 
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Table 8: Existence of official institutional policy document for academic freedom  
Response % EU % UCU 
No 24.1 13.1 
Yes 15.3 15.5 
I don’t know 60.6 71.5 
All (n=6521) 100 (n=4194) 100 (n=2327) 
χ 2 = 118.436  2 df Significant at 1% Level  
 
Question 3: To what extent do you believe that academic freedom is protected in your institution, 
on the scale of 1 (very low protection) to 9 (very high protection)? 
Question 3 asked respondents to score the level of protection for academic freedom within their 
institution on a scale of 1 (very low) to 9 (very high); the results are shown in table 9.1 below.  As 
can be seen, there are stark differences between the results for the two cohorts.  10% of the UCU 
cohort reported the lowest level of protection possible, which was three times that reported by EU 
respondents.  At the other end of the scale, the positions are reversed, in that only 3% of UCU 
members believed that the protection for academic freedom in their institution was very high, 
compared with 9% in the EU nations. 
Table 9.1: Level of protection for academic freedom in respondents’ institutions  
Response % EU % UCU 
1 = Very Low Level of Protection 3.4 10.9 
2 4.0 7.4 
3 5.6 9.4 
4 6.3 9.9 
5= Average Level of Protection 20.6 30.7 
6 11.0 9.9 
7 20.8 11.3 
8 18.5 7.5 
9 = Very High Level of Protection 9.9 3.0 
All (n=6483) 100 (n=4172) 100 (n=2311) 
One Way ANOVA:  F =593.854  1 df Significant at 1% Level  
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Calculating the mean scores reveals similar differences – the mean scale score for UCU 
members was 4.7 out of 9, i.e. below the central scale point, while that for the EU was 6.0, i.e. 
above the central scale point.  Similarly, collapsing the nine point scale into three categories 
produces an enhanced picture of the difference between the EU and UCU data, as is shown in 
table 9.2 below.  Nearly half of the EU respondents believe that there is an above average level of 
protection for academic freedom in their institutions, while half of all UCU respondents consider 
the level of protection to be average.  The proportion of UCU members who consider the level of 
protection to be generally low is more than twice that of their EU counterparts.  The calculation of 
the χ2 value for the aggregated raw data for these collapsed categories (which is necessary, as χ2 
cannot be calculated from percentages), shows these differences between the UCU and EU 
respondents to be significant at the 1% level 
Table 9.2: Level of protection for academic freedom in respondents’ institutions: collapsed categories 
Response % EU % UCU 
Generally Low Level of Protection 
Categories 1 to 3 
12.9 27.7 
Average Level of Protection 
Categories 4 to 6 
37.9 50.5 
Generally High Level of Protection 
Categories 7 to 9 
49.2 21.8 
All (n=6483) 100 (n=4172) 100 (n=2311) 
χ 2 = 515.282  2 df Significant at 1% Level 
 
These tables demonstrate that the generally low level of constitutional and legal protection for 
academic freedom in the UK, as was revealed by the de jure analysis, is mirrored by, rather than 
mitigated by, the cultural commitment to academic freedom that exists within universities at 
departmental level.  This difference between the UK and the other nations of Europe is both 
striking and profound.  A decade ago, when the first author initially examined the legal protection 
for academic freedom in EU, and revealed the comparatively parlous state of the UK, he was 
rebuked by Professor Conor Gearty, director of the Centre for the Study of Human Rights at the 
London School of Economics.  Gearty74 made the point that it was important to distinguish 
between formal constitutional law and how it was implemented, and stated: “Practice on the 
ground often reveals a stronger cultural commitment to freedom than is apparent from perusal of 
the laws.”  The information in tables 9.1 and 9.2 would suggest that, in relation to the UK at least, 
he is in error. 
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Question 4: Does the department in which you work have an official policy documents outlining 
the protection for academic freedom? 
Table 10: Existence of official departmental policy document for academic freedom  
Response % EU % UCU 
No 34.0 37.5 
Yes 13.6 2.3 
I don’t know 52.3 60.2 
All (n=6617) 100 (n=4302) 100 (n=2315) 
χ 2 = 219.9  2 df Significant at 1% Level  
 
The results of the responses to question 4 (which follows on from question 2, which asked about 
the existence of an institutional policy document, as reported in table 8) are given in table 10 
above.  The results show that the same proportion (just over a third) of the UCU and EU cohorts 
report that they have no departmental policy document for academic freedom.  However, a 
greater proportion of EU than UCU respondents report that such a document exists in their 
departments.  The level of ignorance about whether such a document exists is similar for EU and 
UCU cohorts and, while still appalling (less than 50% of respondents knew whether such a 
document existed), is not quite as bad as was reported for institutional documents on academic 
freedom. As with the results in table 8, table 10 shows that the differences between the UCU and 
EU cohorts are significant; moreover the χ2 value in table 10 (219.9) is greater than in table 8 
(118.4) suggesting a more significant difference, but this inference has limited value as the 
differences between the χ2 values could reflect differences between the samples, as people may 
have answered question 2, but not question 4, and vice versa. 
Question 5: To what extent do you believe that academic freedom is protected within the 
academic unit in which you work, on the scale of 1 (very low) to 9 (very high)?  
The results of the responses to question 5 (which follows on from question 3, that asked about the 
level of protection at institutional level, and which are reported in table 2.1) are given in table 11.1 
below. As can be seen clearly, at the lower levels of protection (1 through 4) the proportions 
relating to the UCU cohort exceed those of the EU – for example 11% of UCU respondents report 
the very lowest level of protection in their departments, as against only 3% for the EU cohort.  The 
position is then reversed when looking at the highest level of protection.  So 12.5% of EU 
respondents believe that the level of protection at departmental level is very high, while the 
equivalent figure for the UCU is half that, at 6.3%.  Comparisons reveal that the results in table 
11.1 (protection at departmental level) are very similar to those of table 9.1 (protection at 
institutional level), although the differences between the UCU and the EU cohorts are somewhat 
greater for departmental (than institutional) protection at the lowest level of protection, and less 
marked at the highest level of protection.  
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Table 11.1: Level of protection for academic freedom in respondents’ academic units.  
Response % EU % UCU 
1 = Very Low Level of Protection 3.0 11.0 
2 3.7 8.1 
3 4.6 8.4 
4 5.2 8.5 
5= Average Level of Protection 18.6 23.3 
6 10.2 10.1 
7 21.1 13.9 
8 21.1 10.4 
9 = Very High Level of Protection 12.5 6.3 
All (n=6499) 100 (n = 4196) 100 (n = 2303) 
 Welch ANOVA:     F=475.011      1 df     Significant at 1% level  
 
Calculating the mean scores for the UCU and EU cohorts reveals similar differences – the mean 
scale score for UCU members was 5.0 out of 9, i.e. exactly on the central scale point, while that 
for the EU was 6.3, i.e. above the central scale point.  Both these figures suggest a belief in a 
stronger level of protection at departmental level, when compared with institutional level, for both 
cohorts. As before, collapsing the nine point scale into three categories produces an enhanced 
picture of the difference between the EU and UCU data, as is shown in table 11.2 below.  The 
proportion of UCU respondents considering the level of protection for academic freedom at 
departmental to be generally low was 11.3% - the comparable figure for UCU respondents is 
more than twice this, at 27.5. For the middle/average level of protection (scale scores 4-6), the 
respective total for the UCU was over 40%, compared to circa a third for EU respondents.  At the 
highest levels of protection (i.e. scale scores 7-9), the proportion for EU respondents was over 
half (54.7) while that for UCU respondents was under a third (30%).  Yet again, the level of 
protection for academic freedom perceived to operate at departmental level is markedly lower 
among UCU members than it is among EU respondents. The calculation of the χ2 value for the 
raw data for these collapsed categories (which is necessary, as χ2 cannot be calculated from 
percentages), shows these differences between the UCU and EU respondents to be statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 11.2: Level of protection for academic freedom in respondents’ departments: collapsed categories 
Response % EU % UCU 
Generally Low Level of Protection 
Categories 1 to 3 
11.3 27.5 
Average Level of Protection 
Categories 4 to 6 
34.0 41.9 
Generally High Level of Protection 
Categories 7 to 9 
54.7 30.6 
All (n=6499) 100 (n = 4196) 100 (n = 2303) 
χ 2 = 439.533  2 df Significant at 1% Level 
 
Question 6: Can complaints by staff regarding academic freedom violations in the institution in 
which you work be directed to an institutional and/or department/faculty grievance body? 
Table 12: Existence of an institutional and/or department/faculty grievance body 
Response % EU % UCU 
No 15.9 11.0 
Yes 33.5 18.6 
I don’t know 50.6 70.4 
All (n=6515) 100 (n =  4198) 100 (n = 2317) 
χ 2 = 245.684  2 df Significant at 1% Level  
 
The advancement of knowledge by university staff is premised on challenging, through research, 
whether existing knowledge is accurate and tenable. So, by definition, this process can be 
contentious, such that within the waft and warp of normal academic life, disagreements between 
individuals on a range of issues will occur. Sometimes such disputes will escalate, and lead to the 
infringement of one academic’s freedom by another departmental member.  Hence, in order to 
protect academic freedom, there needs to be a grievance body to which staff can turn, at an 
institutional or departmental level, that offers some form of adjudication.  Table 12 above provides 
information relating to the existence of such bodies, and the knowledge of staff concerning them. 
As can one third of the EU respondents reported the existence of such a body, the comparable 
figure for UCU members was less than a fifth.  By contrast, 11% of UCU respondents and 16% of 
EU respondents reported that such a body did not exist in their institutions. However the majority 
of staff, from both the UCU and EU cohorts, were unaware as to whether or not such a body 
existed. Arguably, it is difficult to see how academic freedom can flourish, in the face of such 
ignorance. 
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Question 7: To what extent do you believe that the protection for academic freedom at the 
institutional, faculty and departmental level has changed in recent years?  
This question required respondents to reflect whether the protection for academic freedom at their 
institution and department had risen, fallen, or remained constant in recent years.  The results are 
shown in table 13.  In both UCU and EU cohorts many respondents were unable to say, or did not 
know, whether the protection for academic freedom had changed (35.2% and 29.6% 
respectively). A much greater proportion (52.1%) of UCU members than EU respondents (33.9%) 
thought that the protection for academic freedom had diminished or greatly diminished.  Not 
surprisingly, relatively few respondents thought that protection for academic freedom had 
increased; however, there was a marked difference between the EU respondents and the UCU 
members; 6% of the EU respondents considered this to be the case compared with just 1.1% of 
UCU members. These figures are indicative of a lowering of protection for academic freedom 
across all EU states, but which is particularly noticeable in the UK, moreover the differences 
between the two cohorts is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Table 13: Changes in the protection for academic freedom 
Response % EU % UCU 
I don’t know/cannot say 29.6 35.2 
Greatly diminished 8.4 20.5 
Diminished 25.5 31.6 
Remained unchanged 30.6 11.7 
Increased 5.3 0.9 
Greatly increased 0.7 0.2 
All (n=6534) 100 (n = 4207) 100 (n = 2327) 
 χ 2 = 519.341     5 df     Significant at 1% level 
 
Question 8: Are you familiar with the following international and national legal instruments that 
protect and promote academic freedom: UNESCO’s 1997 Recommendation concerning the 
Status of Higher Education Teaching Personnel; The 1988 Education Reform Act? 
Question 8 refers to UK legislation on academic freedom (the 1988 Education Reform Act) and 
the more detailed UNESCO 1997 Recommendation which contains comprehensive guidelines for 
the protection of all the facets of academic freedom (for teaching and research, but also shared 
governance, individual and institutional autonomy and tenure).  The UNESCO document, which 
was signed by the (then) Overseas Development Minister, Claire Short on the U.K.’s behalf, is 
widely recognised as an international benchmark for the protection of academic freedom. The 
Joint ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts on the Application of the Recommendation Concerning 
the Status of Teachers (CEART) was established to hear complaints by individuals, institutions 
and NGOs with respect to failures to honour the 1997 Recommendation. The responses to this 
question are shown in tables 14.1 and 14.2 below.  Less than 10% of UCU respondents indicated 
that they were familiar with the UNESCO document, compared with 15% of EU respondents.  
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These relatively low figures are somewhat surprising, given that (as can be seen in table 15.3 
below) 49.2% of EU respondents and 41.7% of UCU respondents claimed to have an adequate 
working knowledge of academic freedom and its associated rights and responsibilities. The 
question about knowledge of the 1988 Education Reform Act, under which tenure was abolished 
in the U.K., has no salience for EU academic staff, and hence did not appear in the EU survey.   
Table 14.1: Knowledge of UNESCO’s 1997 Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher Education 
Teaching Personnel  
Response % EU % UCU 
Yes 15.6 9.9 
No 84.4 90.1 
All (n=6550) 100 (n = 4215) 100 (n = 2335) 
χ 2 = 41.881  1 df Significant at 1% Level  
Table 14.2: Knowledge of the U.K.’s 1988 Education Reform Act 
Response % UCU 
Yes 20.6 
No 79.4 
All (n=2335) 100 (n = 2335) 
 
The results in table 14.2 show that 20% of UCU respondents had heard of this legislation.  Clearly 
(and not surprisingly), UCU respondents had greater knowledge of UK than international legal 
instruments. However, given that the ERA is frequently cited as providing protection for academic 
freedom in the UK, indeed, Farringdon states categorically that: “The only formal protection of 
academic freedom in English law is under the Education Reform Act 1988 s202(2)(a)”,75 it is 
surprising that only one 1 in 5 UCU respondents claims to be familiar with it. It is difficult to 
understand how +40% of UCU respondents can claim to have an adequate knowledge of 
academic freedom, when half this proportion do not know about the 1988 Education Reform Act. 
Question 9: Respondents’ personal knowledge/experience of academic freedom issues: 
Question 9 was a composite question which required respondents to utilise a five point scale to 
indicate the extent of their relative agreement/disagreement with the following statements: 
• My institution has provided me with an adequate introduction to the concept of academic 
freedom. 
• Institutions at which HE courses are taught should be encouraged to organise academic 
freedom readings and discussions for staff. 
• I have an adequate working knowledge of the concept of academic freedom and the rights 
and responsibilities associated with it. 
                                                 
75 D. Palfreyman (2007) “Is academic freedom under threat in UK and US higher education?”, Education and the Law, 
19(1): 24. 
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• I would welcome additional information on the concept of academic freedom and the rights 
and responsibilities associated with it. 
• I have an adequate working knowledge of the regulations, practices and policies governing 
the protection for academic freedom within the institution in which I work. 
• I would welcome additional information on the regulations, practices and policies governing 
the protection for academic freedom within the institution in which I work. 
• I have a better understanding of the concept of academic freedom today than I did when I 
began working in higher education. 
The results are shown in tables 15.1 to 15.7 below.  
The tables provide an enlightening empirical mosaic as to the knowledge of h.e. staff in the UK and 
EU concerning the concept of academic freedom, and their desire to improve their understanding, 
by means of additional information and training.  As with the previous tables, although there are 
similarities in sentiment between the two UCU and EU cohorts, in five instances out of six, the 
differences between the two are statistically significant.   
Turning first to table 15.1, only 5 in 100 UCU respondents strongly agreed/agreed that their 
institution had provided them with an adequate introduction to academic freedom; the comparable 
figure for the EU cohort was nearly triple this. Over 80% of UCU respondents thought that their 
institution had failed to provide an adequate introduction to the concept; the comparable figure for 
the EU was 66%.  It is therefore not surprising that table 15.2 shows both cohorts were equally 
unanimous (EU=74.3%, UCU=72.7%) in agreeing that their institution should organise readings 
on academic freedom and staff discussions on the topic. 
Table 15.1: My institution has provided me with an adequate introduction to the concept of academic 
freedom 
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 2.8 1.3 
Agree 12.8 3.3 
Neither agree nor disagree 24.3 14.3 
Disagree 33.9 36.5 
Strongly disagree 26.1 44.7 
All (n=6501) 100 (n = 4189) 100 (n = 2312) 
 Welch ANOVA:     F=440.958    1 df     Significant at the 1% level  
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Table 15.2: Institutions at which HE courses are taught should be encouraged to organise academic freedom 
readings and discussions for staff  
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 25.6 29.4 
Agree 48.7 43.3 
Neither agree nor disagree 19.3 19.1 
Disagree 5.1 5.0 
Strongly disagree 1.3 3.1 
All (n=6518) 100 (n = 4195) 100 (n = 2313) 
Welch ANOVA:     F=0.239    1 df     Not Significant 
 
Tables 15.3 and 15.4 address whether respondents have an adequate working knowledge of 
academic freedom, and whether they need additional information on it.  Despite being ignorant as 
to whether their department or institution has an academic freedom policy document (tables 8 and 
10), and believing that the level of protection is low, indeed, has diminished in recent years (table 
13), nearly half the EU respondents and 41.7% of the UCU respondents claimed to have an 
adequate working knowledge of academic freedom. Hence a greater proportion of staff claimed to 
have an adequate working knowledge, than made a contrary claim, and the difference between 
the two (EU and UCU) cohorts was statistically significant.  However, despite the majority claiming 
to have adequate knowledge of academic freedom, table 15.4 shows that 74% of EU and 81.6% 
of UCU respondents said they would welcome more information on the subject.  It is worth 
considering: if your knowledge of the topic is adequate, why would you want more information? 
These unusual results suggest that the knowledge that academics profess to have with respect to 
academic freedom, is probably at variance with the reality of the situation. 
Table 15.3: I have an adequate working knowledge of the concept of academic freedom and the rights and 
responsibilities associated with it: 
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 11.2 7.8 
Agree 38.0 33.9 
Neither agree nor disagree 23.9 25.0 
Disagree 21.3 24.8 
Strongly disagree 5.6 8.5 
All (n=6504) 100 (n = 4188) 100 (n = 2316) 
One way ANOVA:     F=51.133     1 df     Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 15.4: I would welcome additional information on the concept of academic freedom and the rights and 
responsibilities associated with it 
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 24.3 33.4 
Agree 49.7 48.2 
Neither agree nor disagree 18.4 13.8 
Disagree 6.0 3.5 
Strongly disagree 1.6 1.1 
All (n=6485) 100 (n = 4182) 100 (n = 2303) 
Welch ANOVA:     F=81.348     1 df     Significant at the 1% level 
 
Table 15.5 provides data on respondents’ working knowledge of the regulations and practices 
governing academic freedom protection in their institutions.  As can be seen this table mirrors that 
of 15.3. above, in that only 12% of UCU respondents claimed to have an adequate working 
knowledge of institutional regulations governing the protection for academic freedom; in contrast 
the comparable figure for European respondents was 27.6%, more than twice the UCU figure, 
which suggests either that higher education institutions in Europe are better able to keep their 
staff informed about such matters, or that staff in Europe are more concerned about institutional 
policies and therefore make the effort to ensure that they are aware of what they comprise.  
Table 15.5: I have an adequate working knowledge of the regulations, practices, and policies governing the 
protection for academic freedom within the institution in which I work 
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 5.1 2.0 
Agree 22.5 10.0 
Neither agree nor disagree 26.4 19.6 
Disagree 34.4 44.4 
Strongly disagree 11.6 24.1 
All (n=6481) 100 (n = 4173) 100 (n = 2302) 
Welch ANOVA:     F=408.413     1 df     Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 15.6 gives information on whether staff would welcome additional practical information on 
the regulations and policies on academic freedom in their institutions. This table’s results largely 
mirror those of table 15.4, but with slightly more staff wishing for practical advice (table 15.6) than 
for information on the concept of academic freedom (table 15.4).  Table 15.7 examines whether 
respondents’ understanding of academic freedom is greater now than when they first began 
working in higher education. Half of the EU cohort thought that their understanding had improved, 
when compared with 37.3% of UCU cohort; conversely, a greater % of UCU (33.0%), than EU 
(22.4%) respondents disagreed that their understanding of the concept had improved.  This data 
could be a reflection of, inter alia, the age of respondents and the length of time they have been 
working in h.e. If an academic was employed at (say) a Finnish university for 20 years, their 
understanding of the concept would doubtless have improved to a greater extent that a UK 
lecturer in post for only two years. 
Table 15.6: I would welcome additional information on the regulations, practices and policies governing the 
protection for academic freedom within the institution in which I work  
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 22.5 33.5 
Agree 52.0 49.9 
Neither agree nor disagree 18.2 11.9 
Disagree 6.0 3.4 
Strongly disagree 1.3 1.3 
All (n=6481) 100 (n = 4178) 100 (n = 2303) 
One way ANOVA:     F=106.128     1 df     Significant at the 1% level 
 
Table 15.7: I have a better understanding of the concept of academic freedom today than I did when I began 
working in higher education  
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 14.5 9.4 
Agree 36.3 27.9 
Neither agree nor disagree 26.7 29.6 
Disagree 15.7 22.9 
Strongly disagree 6.7 10.1 
All (n=6492) 100 (n = 4177) 100 (n = 2315) 
One way ANOVA:     F=126.643     1 df     Significant at the 1% level 
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Question 10: Asked respondents to write down any other comments/opinions that they wished to 
make, concerning academic freedom in their department/faculty and institution. Non-relevant text 
responses, such as ‘n/a’ and ‘see above’ were removed resulting in 779 written responses (a total 
of over 42,000 Words), much fewer than the +2000 respondents who completed question 1. As 
respondents had been given the invitation to express their personal thoughts on the topic in the 
first question on the survey, they were less likely to respond to this question. Constraints of time 
made it impossible to analyse this textual data in any meaningful way, however, the full set of 
comments are provide on pages 196-219 in the Appendix Tables (which are available on 
request), and by way of illustration, the first 10 comments are given below in table 16.  
Table 16: Examples of “other comments about academic freedom in department/faculty and institution” 
Comments 
It's never been an issue that has impinged upon me or my work, so far as I am aware. 
The concept of 'protecting freedom' is potentially subject to abuse.  The individuals who make use of their 
academic should be protected, but the freedom itself must simply be promoted/not violated.  Once we enter 
the domain of 'protecting freedom' all forms of legal processes will be devised to restrict freedom in the name 
of its 'protection'.  This is what power always does.  I therefore expected the survey to make much less use 
of the paternalistic concept of 'protection' and greater use of 'defending', 'upholding', 'promoting'.  This is what 
a healthy academic environment requires - not regulation of freedom, but deregulation to expand this 
freedom (in the field of ideas and the production and exchange of knowledge) 
Recent 'restructuring' of the Department has meant a considerable loss of academic freedom and overt 
censorship in terms of topics that are 'acceptable' for research grants, publications and public outreach 
events. 
HE in FE there is a clear motion from management to completely disregard academic freedom.  
I have not experienced any limits to academic freedom - but that is probably because I do not research or 
teach very controversial areas. Probably the most controversial topics I deal with concern energy supply and 
debates about political response to climate change. I guess that if a colleague or student were to complain 
that my approach to these issues were biased, then I would have to understand better the overall issues of 
academic freedom. 
My institution has a habit over many years of closing down innovative programmes - rather than working out 
ways to build upon its history. 
It's something I've read around, the only time I needed to know more as I wanted to teach something 
controversial management were helpful in enabling me to develop the lesson plan 
Junior researchers (postdocs) are completely exposed to the whims and agenda of senior Faculty.  
The STERN review and outside monitoring makes department control somewhat irrelevant  
The working conditions and the respect for academic freedom are so compromised in my institution that I am 
thinking to leave the academia for good. We are required to do more for less. No support, no respect 
whatsoever for our research and no acknowledgment of the multiple successful outcomes. The salary is 
humiliating too. Only the students seem to acknowledge what we do. Most of them, at least. 
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10 Respondents’ Personal Experiences of Direct Challenges to Academic Freedom 
The second part of the survey looked at respondents’ personal experiences of direct challenges to 
their academic freedom.  As before, this section used a series of dichotomous (yes/no) and Likert 
scale questions. 
Question 11: Respondents’ experience of challenges to their academic freedom resulting from 
disciplinary action, or the threat of it: 
Question 11 was a composite question which examined intra-mural and extra-mural utterance, 
and required respondents to indicate whether they had ever been subjected to informal or formal 
disciplinary action, or the threat of disciplinary action (up to, and including, dismissal) because of: 
• Academic views they expressed in their teaching 
• Academic views they expressed in a research publication 
• Views they expressed in a non-public forum within your institution (for example, in a 
meeting of Senate or Academic Board) 
• Views they expressed in a public forum outside your institution (for example, in a local or 
national newspaper, or in a television or radio programme) 
• Views they expressed elsewhere 
The results are shown in tables 17.1 to 17.5 below. Although there are statistically significant 
differences between the UCU and EU cohorts in three out of five instances, with respect to these 
questions (and the results in Tables 17.1 to 17.5) generally, it appears that the use of disciplinary 
action, or the threat of such action, is relatively rare – in most cases the proportion of staff 
reporting such threats is 6% or less.  The occurrence of threats which result from academic 
utterance, with respect to teaching or research dissemination (two major aspects of academic 
freedom), is very low.  Threats appear most likely to occur following academic views expressed 
within the institution, in non-public bodies such as Senate or Academic Board, suggesting that 
academic shared governance (another major supportive element of academic freedom) may be 
more contentious, than freedom for teaching or research, but even then, such occurrences affect 
only 1 person in 12 (8%) of the academic community.  Generally, the formal or informal use, or 
threat, of disciplinary action is negligible.  
The low occurrence of such actions, however, does not diminish the devastating effect they may 
have on the small number of staff affected, as the examples of (inter alia) Hicham Yezza and 
Rizwaan Sabir76 from the University of Nottingham, and Aubrey Blumsohn77 from the University of 
Sheffield, make clear. 
 
  
                                                 
76 For full details, see M. Daly & S. Matthews, (2009) Academic freedom and the University of Nottingham, York: Zoilus 
Press 
77 C. Dyer, (2009) “Aubrey Blumsohn: Academic who took on industry”, British Medical Journal, 339: b5293. 
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Table 17.1: Subjected to disciplinary action, or the threat of disciplinary action because of academic views 
expressed in teaching 
Subjected to/threatened with disciplinary action for: Response % EU % UCU 
Academic views expressed in teaching 
Yes 5.3 5.7 
No 94.7 94.3 
All (n=6439)  100 (n =  4141) 100 (n = 2298) 
χ 2 = 0.473     1 df     Not Significant 
 
Table 17.2: Subjected to disciplinary action, or the threat of disciplinary action because of academic views 
expressed in a research publication 
Subjected to/threatened with disciplinary action for Response % EU % UCU 
Academic views expressed in a research publication 
Yes 5.0 2.8 
No 95.0 97.2 
All (n=6428)  100 (n =  4142) 100 (n = 2286) 
χ 2 = 16.55     1 df     Significant at 1% level 
 
Table 17.3: Subjected to disciplinary action, or the threat of disciplinary action because of academic views 
expressed in a non-public forum in your institution (e.g. Senate, Academic Board) 
Subjected to/threatened with disciplinary action for Response % EU % UCU 
Academic views expressed in a non-public forum in your 
institution (e.g. Senate, Academic Board) 
Yes 7.8 8.4 
No 92.2 91.6 
All (n=6440)  100 (n =  4141) 100 (n = 2299) 
χ 2 = 0.71     1 df     Not Significant 
 
Table 17.4: Subjected to, or threatened with, disciplinary action, because of academic views expressed in a 
public forum outside your institution (local/national newspaper, radio/tv programme) 
Subjected to/threatened with disciplinary action for Response % EU % UCU 
Academic views expressed in a public forum outside your 
institution (e.g. local newspaper) 
Yes 5.6 4.1 
No 94.4 95.9 
All (n= 6429)  100 (n =  4140) 100 (n = 2289) 
χ 2 = 7.068     1 df     Significant at 1% level 
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Table 17.5: Subjected to disciplinary action, or the threat of disciplinary action because of academic views 
expressed elsewhere - neither within the institution or a public forum) 
Subjected to/threatened with disciplinary action for Response % EU % UCU 
Academic views expressed elsewhere (neither within the 
institution or in a public forum) 
Yes 4.6 6.8 
No 95.7 93.2 
All (n= 6489)  100 (n =  4215) 100 (n = 2274) 
χ 2 = 18.319     1 df     Significant at 1% level 
 
Question 12: This question was designed to enable respondents who had been subjected to 
disciplinary action, or the threat of it, for expressing their academic views elsewhere, to provide 
details. As can be seen in table 17.5, the number of respondents for whom this question was 
relevant were relatively small; in fact only 142 respondents provided details. Common themes 
included expressing academic views via social media and email. Full details of these comments 
are provided on pages 220-224 in the Appendix Tables (available on request), and by way of 
illustration, the first 10 comments are given below in table 18. 
Table 18: Example of “disciplinary action, or the threat of disciplinary action, for academic views expressed 
elsewhere” 
Response 
At a recent university training session I expressed concern at some of the views being promoted by the tutor; 
I was required to repeat the training session with the strong hint that I should keep my mouth shut. 
in union meetings at a previous institution 
Meetings with line managers. 
Informal conversations with line manager. Always ready to create problems, rather than solving them 
It is generally discouraged in public engagement work that we do not speak out against management styles 
inside institutional life even though they are often out-dated. 
Some years ago I was suspended from a joint university/NHS post because of accusations that I had 
disclosed poor practice in another NHS trust to a Community Health Council 
within department meetings 
In team meetings which included former line manager. 
At a lecture setting and a blog. 
At a previous institutions. As a PhD student. I was disciplined for asking certain questions. 
Question 13: was a composite question which asked respondents to indicate whether, because 
of their academic views they had ever been subjected to/threatened with the following sanctions: 
• Denial of promotion. 
• Demotion to a lower position. 
• Being moved to another department/centre/unit. 
• Being given different/fewer/additional administrative tasks. 
• Being given different/fewer/additional teaching or research duties. 
• Removal of research funding/facilities/equipment. 
• Bullying by academic colleagues. 
• Another form of sanction 
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The results are shown in tables 19.1 to 19.8 below.  The first two elements of question 13 concern 
threats with respect to changes in the employment contract of respondents (promotion denial and 
demotion) for academic views expressed. As can be seen the threat of demotion is relatively 
uncommon - less than 4% of both cohorts report this occurrence.  The situation with respect to 
denial of promotion is more common: 1 respondent in 10 among the EU cohort, and 1 in 8 of the 
UCU cohort reported such sanctions being used against them. The χ2 statistic shows that the 
differences between the cohorts is significant – such threats are more likely in institutions in the 
UK, than in the EU nations.  However, such threats may have greater occupational salience in the 
EU, in that in some nations (such as Spain), the denial of promotion may constitute a denial of 
tenure for the person affected. 
Table 19.1: Subjected to/ threatened with promotion denial because of academic views expressed in 
teaching 
Subjected to/threatened with the following 
sanctions because of academic views held: 
Response % EU % UCU 
Denial of promotion 
Yes 10.2 11.9 
No 89.8 88.1 
All (n=6403)  100 (n =  4120) 100 (n = 2283) 
χ 2 = 4.508     1 df     Significant at 5% level  
 
Table 19.2: Subjected to/ threatened with demotion because of academic views expressed in teaching 
Subjected to/threatened with the following 
sanctions because of academic views held: 
Response % EU % UCU 
Demotion to a lower position  
Yes 3.7 3.8 
No 96.3 96.2 
All (n=6378)  100 (n =  4113) 100 (n = 2265) 
χ 2 = 0.117     1 df     Not Significant 
 
The next three elements concern threats to move staff, or to alter their administrative and 
teaching and research duties, because of the academic views they may hold. Table 19.3 shows 
that being moved to another department is a very rare event, and that its occurrence is as 
frequent among UCU respondents as it is among EU respondents.  This may be because such 
moves would require the acquiescence of another departmental head and, moreover, possible 
approval at a more senior level (e.g. Dean, or Pro-Vice Chancellor).  By contrast, as tables 19.4 
and 19.5 show, being given different and/or additional tasks is a more frequent modus of sanction.  
1 in 12 EU respondents and 1 in 8 UCU respondents reported having changes made to their 
administrative tasks as a form of sanction, and the difference between the two cohorts is 
statistically significant.  Table 19.5 shows that changes to teaching and research duties were also 
used as a form of punishment, and at a greater level of frequency.  Yet again, UCU members are 
more likely to report such practices than their EU counterparts. Such statistics reflect badly on the 
UK academic profession, suggesting (as they do) that in an average sized department (circa 30 
50 
staff78) of a UK university or f.e. institution, 3 or 4 staff may have been routinely subjected to such 
punitive treatment. 
Table 19.3: Subjected to/ threatened with being moved to another department/centre/unit because of 
academic views expressed in teaching 
Subjected to/threatened with the following 
sanctions because of academic views held: 
Response % EU % UCU 
Being moved to another department/centre/unit. 
Yes 4.2 3.8 
No 95.8 96.2 
All (n=6382)  100 (n =  4117) 100 (n = 2265) 
χ 2 = 0.481     1 df     Not Significant 
 
Table 19.4: Subjected to/ threatened with being given different/fewer/additional administrative tasks 
because of academic views expressed in teaching  
Subjected to/threatened with the following 
sanctions because of academic views held: 
Response % EU % UCU 
Given different/fewer/additional administrative tasks  
Yes 8.2 12.2 
No 91.8 87.8 
All (n=6383)  100 (n =  4119) 100 (n = 2264) 
χ 2 = 27.051     1 df     Significant at 1% level 
 
Table 19.5: Subjected to/threatened with different/fewer/additional teaching or research duties because 
of academic views expressed in teaching 
Subjected to/threatened with the following 
sanctions because of academic views held: 
Response % EU % UCU 
Given different/fewer/additional teaching or research 
duties  
Yes 9.2 13.2 
No 90.8 86.5 
All (n=6391)  100 (n =  4120) 100 (n = 2271) 
χ 2 = 24.625     1 df     Significant at 1% level 
 
The next element of question 13 looked at threats to remove research funding and facilities, 
because of the academic views staff hold. Table 19.6 shows that this occurs to about 1 in 14 of 
respondents, in both the UCU and EU cohorts, and hence this sanction seems to be used 
relatively infrequently.  This is probably because such punishments are not with the purview of 
Heads of Departments. Grants from government and other funding bodies (e.g. charitable 
foundations like the UK Leverhulme Foundation), are awarded to individual researchers, and 
                                                 
78 M. Deschryvere, (2009) “A comparative survey of structural characteristics of Finnish university departments”, ETLA 
Discussion Paper No. 1195, Helsinki: ETLA, p. 4 
51 
attempts to remove them would probably risk the institution being accused of fraud or financial 
maladministration. Additionally, many academics, because of their chosen subject specialism, 
may not require dedicated technical equipment.  Hence the threat of removal of access to (e.g.) 
chemical laboratories or television studies may pose a threat to Professors of Chemistry or of 
Media Studies, but could not easily be deployed against a Professor of Divinity or of Italian 
Studies, although the latter could be threatened by reduced funds for travel. 
Table 19.6: Subjected to/threatened with removal of research funding/facilities/equipment because of 
academic views expressed in teaching 
Subjected to/threatened with the following 
sanctions because of academic views held: 
Response % EU % UCU 
Removal of research funding, facilities or equipment  
Yes 7.2 7.1 
No 92.8 92.9 
All (n=6367)  100 (n =  4104) 100 (n = 2263) 
χ 2 = 0.005     1 df     Not Significant 
 
The next element of question 13 examined whether respondents were subjected to bullying 
because of the academic views they held.  As can be seen in table 19.7, 14.1% (1 in 7) of the EU 
respondents reported being subjected to bullying, and 23.1% (almost 1 in 4) of the UCU 
respondents reported similar occurrences.  The χ2 test shows that the difference between the EU 
and UCU cohorts is statistically significant. Given that a major premise of academic freedom (and, 
moreover, freedom of speech) is the freedom to express one’s professional opinion, the presence 
of such statistics with respect seats of higher learning are truly appalling, and are a disgrace to 
higher education institutions across the EU, and more particularly the UK.  Such research as has 
been done on this topic,79 suggest that the figures reported here are typical rather than aberrant.  
It is worth considering, if academics routinely bully (and allow others to routinely bully) their 
colleagues to such a degree that it is commonplace, what example is being passed on to those 
whom they teach? 
Table 19.7: Subjected to/threatened with bullying because of academic views expressed in teaching 
Subjected to/threatened with the following 
sanctions because of academic views held: 
Response % EU % UCU 
Bullying by academic colleagues. 
Yes 14.1 23.1 
No 85.9 76.9 
All (n=6396)  100 (n =  4106) 100 (n = 2290) 
χ 2 = 82.887     1 df     Significant at the 1% level  
 
                                                 
79 See, for example, L. Keashly, & J. Neuman,  (2010) “Faculty Experiences with Bullying in Higher Education: Causes, 
Consequences, and Management”, Administrative Theory & Praxis, 32(1): 48-70. 
D. Lewis, (1999) “Workplace bullying — Interim findings of a study in further and higher education in Wales”, 
International Journal of Manpower, 20(1/2):106-119. 
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The final element of question 13 looked at other forms of sanction to which academic staff may 
have been subjected, and the results are given below in table 19.8.  As can be seen, with respect 
to the UCU cohort, more than 1 in 10 reported other forms of sanction to which they had been 
subjected – more than twice the proportion of the EU respondents.  Hence 229 (10.2%) of 2247 
UCU respondents who completed this question, had been subjected to other forms of sanction. 
Given that many punitive forms of sanction have been covered in question 13, it is worth 
considering what other methods may have been employed. 
Table 19.8: Subjected to/threatened with another form of sanction because of academic views expressed 
in teaching 
Subjected to/threatened with the following 
sanctions because of academic views held: 
Response % EU % UCU 
Another form of sanction 
Yes 4.5 10.2 
No 95.5 89.8 
All (n=6462)  100 (n =  4215) 100 (n = 2247) 
χ 2 = 79.747     1 df     Significant at the 1% level  
 
Question 14: This question was designed to enable respondents who had been subjected 
to/threatened with another form of sanction to supply information concerning this. A total of 214 
responses were received for this question, of which 17 mentioned dismissal, or the threat of 
dismissal. Some of the responses provide graphic accounts of how severely some universities 
seek to punish staff even when, for example, staff whistleblowing reveals serious fraud. Full 
details of these comments are provided on pages 225-231 in the Appendix Tables (available on 
request), and by way of illustration, the first 10 comments are given below in table 20. 
Table 20: Example of “actual or threatened disciplinary actions” 
Response 
Dismissal for bringing the University into Disrepute 
I didn't receive a sanction but colleagues I worked with were fired at a previous institution 
Forms of (diplomatic) harassment from line manager 
Non verbalised and hidden exclusions from a range of activities in which my views are seen as subversive to 
marketisation, commodification and top down management 
Written warning 
Poor evaluation due to lack of commercial research grants 
Threatened with losing additional lecturing if I didn't 'comply' 
Rather than a denial of promotion, what is as mendacious is a delaying of promotion. Selection measures are 
introduced which are about stalling progression until you come into the fold of management-speak. 
I was threatened with dismissal for being brave enough to speak up against things. 
Denial of sabbatical on several occasions 
 
Question 15: This question invited those respondents who had experienced bullying to provide 
more detailed information about the treatment to which they had been subjected. As above non-
relevant text such as ‘n/a’ for example was removed giving a total of 608 responses for this 
question. Full details of these responses, which demonstrate a range of negative and abusive 
tactics routinely used against staff, which range from the petty and trivial (being ignored) to 
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serious, possibly criminal, activity (stalking, sexual harassment and assault), are given on pages 
232-261 of the Appendix Tables (which are available on request); by way of illustration, the first 
10 comments are given below in table 21 (and have been abridged/anonymised, as necessary). 
Table 21: Examples of bullying 
Response 
Isolation, exclusion, direct conflict, passive aggression, mobbing. Thankfully, this mostly happened in the past and 
only in a few instances. The relationship with colleagues tends to be good. Not collegial, but good. The problems 
mostly concern management. 
Bullying on grounds of my gender, age and political ideology (with the implication that these features undermined 
my academic credibility) from a colleague (who has since left the institution). 
Thinly veiled threats and undermining by line manager 
shouting  
Threats were made about possible sanctions I was asked to stop research work and threatened with sanctions if I 
didn't I was brought to a large meeting to account for my actions - no wrongdoing was discovered All of this was in 
a previous institution  
Gossip and isolation.  
Political wranglings to take away courses and research interests  
University life is rife with institutional bullying in many, many departments. The typical scenario is that 
management committees in departments are peopled by those chosen for their insider status. Others are then 
effectively ostracised. This is endemic in academe. 
resistance to the relaxation of academic standards regarded as not being a team player 
 
Question 16: was a composite question which asked respondents to indicate whether, because 
of their academic views they had ever been subjected to/threatened with the following modes of 
abuse by people within the institution in which they worked: 
• physical harm. 
• psychological pressure. 
• sexual abuse or assault. 
• sexual harassment (e.g. derogatory remarks) 
• false charges brought against them 
The results are given in tables 22.1 to 22.5 below 
The first two elements of question 16 concern threats of physical and psychological pressure. As 
can been seen from table 22.1, occurrences of physical harm are very rare indeed – less than 1% 
of respondents from both EU and UCU cohorts reported this form of physical threat.  The situation 
with regard to psychological pressure is, however, very different. Table 22.2 shows that 15.7% (1 
in 7) of the EU cohort, and 26.6% (more than 1 in 4) of the UCU cohort report being subjected to 
psychological pressure.  When comparing the various abuses highlighted in these tables, 
psychological pressure is more common even than bullying (indeed, there is probably an overlap 
between these, as psychological pressure is a form of bullying).  As with most of the analyses in 
this study, respondents in the UCU cohort demonstrate a greater familiarity with this form of 
indefensible behaviour, than their EU counterparts – reports of psychological pressure is nearly 
twice as prevalent among UCU respondents as their EU counterparts. 
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Table 22.1: Subjected to/ threatened with physical harm because of academic views  
Subjected to/threatened with the following because 
of academic views held: 
Response % EU % UCU 
Physical harm 
Yes 0.9 1.3 
No 99.1 98.7 
All (n= 6406)  100 (n = 4106) 100 (n = 2300) 
χ 2 = 3.548     1 df     Not Significant  
 
Table 22.2: Subjected to/ threatened with psychological pressure because of academic views  
Subjected to/threatened with the following 
because of academic views held: 
Response % EU % UCU 
Psychological pressure 
Yes 15.7 26.6 
No 84.3 73.4 
All (n= 6422)  100 (n = 4111) 100 (n = 2311) 
χ 2 = 111.906     1 df     Significant at 1% level  
 
The next two elements concern threats of sexual abuse, assault and harassment. Table 22.3 
shows that the experience of, or threat of, sexual abuse or assault is even more rare than physical 
harm, with an occurrence of less than 1% in both EU and UCU cohorts. The situation is more 
negative with respect to sexual harassment (table 22.4), and its occurrence is more frequent 
among UCU, than EU respondents.  Although these figures are very low, it can be considered 
surprising that such events occur at all, given that all universities strive to improve awareness 
through campaigns that ensure that sexual harassment among the student body is not considered 
tolerable behaviour. 
Table 22.3: Subjected to/ threatened with sexual abuse or assault because of academic views  
Subjected to/threatened with the following because 
of academic views held: 
Response % EU % UCU 
Sexual abuse or assault 
Yes 0.6 0.7 
No 99.4 99.3 
All (n=6395)  100 (n = 4111) 100 (n = 2284) 
χ 2 = 0.056     1 df     Not Significant  
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Table 22.4: Subjected to/ threatened with sexual harassment because of academic views  
Subjected to/threatened with the following because 
of academic views held: 
Response % EU % UCU 
Sexual harassment 
Yes 2.6 3.5 
No 97.4 96.5 
All (n= 6390)  100 (n = 4109) 100 (n = 2281) 
χ 2 = 4.727     1 df     Significant at 5% level  
 
The final element of question 16 looked at the threat of legal charges being brought against an 
individual because of their academic views.  Table 22.5 shows that this form of coercion is more 
frequent than might commonly be imagined.  10.6% of UCU respondents, and 6.3% of EU 
respondents reported that this form of sanction had been used against them.  
Table 22.5: Subjected to/ threatened with charges being brought a because of academic views  
Subjected to/threatened with the following because 
of academic views held: 
Response % EU % UCU 
Charges being brought against you 
Yes 6.3 10.6 
No 93.7 89.4 
All (n=6354)  100 (n = 4086) 100 (n = 2268) 
χ 2 = 36.979     1 df     Significant at 1% level  
 
The greater frequency of the use of legal constraints to harass staff in the UK may be a reflection 
of the UK legal system. The law on defamation has led to the UK being described as “the libel 
capital of the Western world”,80 and the ease with which such charges can be made in the UK, 
when compared with other EU states, may account for some of the difference. 
 
Question 17: asked whether respondents had ever undertaken self-censorship (that is, refrained 
from publishing, teaching, talking or doing research on a particular topic), for fear of negative 
repercussions, such as loss of privileges, demotion, physical harm.  
The results in table 23 below show that self-censorship is very common, with 19.1% of EU 
respondents admitting to have subjected themselves to self-censorship at work, while the 
comparative figure for the UCU was significantly higher at 35.5%.  The data in previous tables in 
this analysis have shown that many staff have had their academic freedom abrogated and thereby 
been subjected to cruel and degrading treatment by their peers, on account of their academic 
views.  The results in table 23 could suggest that it is only self-censorship by a sizeable cohort of 
staff that prevents the incidence of bullying, psychology pressure and other unconscionable 
behaviour from being even higher.  Self-censorship at this level appears to make a mockery of 
any pretence by universities of being paragons of free speech and that of being advocates of 
unhindered discourse in the pursuit of knowledge and academic freedom. 
                                                 
80 H. Maly (2006) “Publish at Your Own Risk or Don't Publish at All: Forum Shopping Trends in Libel Litigation Leave the 
First Amendment Unguaranteed”, Journal of Law and Policy, 14(2): 906 
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Table 23: Extent of self-censorship 
Response % EU % UCU 
No 19.1 35.5 
Yes 80.9 64.5 
All (n=6292) 100 (n = 3982) 100 (n = 2310) 
χ 2 = 209.104  2 df Significant at 1% Level  
 
 
Question 18: This question invited respondents who had experienced self-censorship to provide 
more detailed information about the form of their self-censorship. After removing non-relevant text 
a total of 742 respondents provided information on self-censorship. These ranged in severity from 
“keeping my mouth shut” to “I no longer attend any staff meetings in my teaching department, or 
faculty meetings, or reply to any general email circulars from within my University asking for my 
opinion, and minimise contact with all other members of my University”.  On reading these 
remarks, it is difficult to see how universities can operate as institutions of open and free debate, 
dedicated to the enhancement of knowledge.  The responses to this question have been provided 
on pages 262-284 of Appendix Taables, and by way of illustration, the first 10 comments are 
given below in table 24. 
Table 24 Examples of “self-censorship” 
Response 
I no longer attend any staff meetings in my teaching department, or faculty meetings, or reply to any general 
email circulars from within my University asking for my opinion, and minimise contact with all other members of 
my University for fear that any communication from me will be used against me in support of the ongoing 
disciplinary action. 
Told I 'would not get any institutional PhD studentships or financial support for my selected area of research' 
Avoided speaking out on the issues 
refrained participating in expert reviews for funding bodies, organisation of conferences 
Not addressing controversial issues 
Modifying my research online 
Not include things in teaching 
Changing the direction of my research interest and switching to a teaching-intensive rather than research-
intensive post 
not talking publicly in university meetings 
Refrained from discussion a topic due to someone else been reprimanded on a subject (I don't know how they 
worded it and I don't know if they voiced un professional opinions) I was merely told this by someone who has 
now left that they were reprimanded for voicing their opinion. 
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Question 19: was a composite question which asked respondents to indicate whether, because 
of their academic views they had ever experienced, or been threatened with, infringement of their 
academic freedom because of their:  
• Sexual orientation/identity. 
• Ethnicity. 
• Gender. 
• Political views. 
• Some other reason. 
The results are given in tables 25.1 to 25.5 below 
All the results in tables 25.1 to 25.5 reflect the personal characteristics of staff (sexual orientation, 
gender ethnicity, etc.), but which should not, in a higher education institution founded on freedom 
of thought, opinion, etc., have any bearing on how staff are treated.  The figures show that, with 
respect to sexual orientation and ethnicity, very few staff are affected – less than 4%.  For gender, 
the figure for UCU staff reporting infringements of academic freedom rises to 6.8%, rising further 
to 9.3% with respect to political views.  Discrimination on the basis of these characteristics is 
illegal under the UK 2010 Equality Act, which was enacted following the EU Equal Treatment 
Directives, whose powers and provisions it emulates and implements.  The final element of this 
question concerns threats relating to another reason not specified in this question; 12.7% of the 
UCU respondents (1 person in 8) claimed that they had been subjected to constraints on their 
academic freedom.  Although these proportions are relatively small, they demonstrate that the 
Equality Act is not working sufficiently well to safeguard those individuals for whom it should 
protect.  What is striking about tables 25.1 to 25.5 is that, in every instance, the proportion of UCU 
members affected exceeds the comparable figure for the European cohort, and that all of these 
differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.  For example, the proportion of UCU staff 
reporting that their academic freedom was abrogated on account of their political beliefs was 9.3% 
- more than twice the equivalent figures (4.5%) for the European respondents.  Given that 
universities are founded on the basis of freedom of speech, and the advancement of knowledge 
via informed debate, such comparative figures reflect poorly on the academic community in the 
UK, and on broader British society more generally, in which, arguably, greater levels of 
intolerance exist than those which occur within universities. 
Table 25.1: Subjected to/ threatened with infringement of academic freedom on account of sexual 
orientation/identity 
Subjected to/ threatened with infringement of 
academic freedom on account of 
Response % EU % UCU 
Sexual orientation/identity 
Yes 0.7 2.2 
No 99.3 97.8 
All (n=6336)  100 (n = 4075) 100 (n = 2261) 
χ 2 = 25.384     1 df     Significant at 1% level  
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Table 25.2: Subjected to/ threatened with infringement of academic freedom on account of ethnicity 
Subjected to/ threatened with infringement of 
academic freedom on account of 
Response % EU % UCU 
Ethnicity 
Yes 0.7 3.7 
No 99.3 96.3 
All (n=6361)  100 (n = 4091) 100 (n = 2270) 
χ 2 = 74.568     1 df     Significant at 1% level  
Table 25.3: Subjected to/ threatened with infringement of academic freedom on account of gender 
Subjected to/ threatened with infringement of 
academic freedom on account of 
Response % EU % UCU 
Gender 
Yes 4.6 6.8 
No 95.4 93.2 
All (n= 6390)  100 (n =  4108) 100 (n = 2282) 
χ 2 = 14.00     1 df     Significant at 1% level  
Table 25.4: Subjected to/ threatened with infringement of academic freedom on account of political views 
Subjected to/ threatened with infringement of 
academic freedom on account of 
Response % EU % UCU 
Political views 
Yes 4.5 9.3 
No 65.5 34.5 
All (n=6379)  100 (n = 4103) 100 (n = 2276) 
χ 2 = 57.930     1 df     Significant at 1% level  
Table 25.5: Subjected to/ threatened with infringement of academic freedom for some other reason 
Subjected to/ threatened with infringement of 
academic freedom on account of 
Response % EU % UCU 
Some other (unspecified) reason  
Yes 3.2 12.7 
No 96.8 87.3 
All (n= 6471)  100 (n = 4215) 100 (n = 2256) 
χ 2 = 219.986     1 df     Significant at 1% level  
 
Question 20: This question invited those respondents who had been subjected to/ threatened 
with infringement of academic freedom on account of some other reason to provide more detailed 
information about the reason their academic freedom had been negated.  A total of 262 
responses were received in respect to this question, which suggests that the options offered on 
the closed question on this topic covered the majority of reasons for the curtailment of academic 
freedom.  Comments that recurred included ageism, disability, ethnicity, and religion – the full set 
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of comments are provided on pages 285-293 of the Appendix Tables (available on request), and 
by way of illustration, the first 10 comments are given below in table 26. 
Table 26: Examples of threatened because of other reasons (ageism, disability, ethnicity, etc.) 
Response 
My views on research ethics 
1) Being pressured into changing research subject 2) Being requested to surrender an awarded research grant 3) 
Being made to supervise a PhD student without my free consent. 
being un-tenured, on temporary contract 
Age 
seniority reasons and rankism 
Line manager's several forms of harassment, intrusion and passive aggression not motivated by academic 
matters but rather by several other matters (such as: power, budget related issues, jealousy for academic 
success, lack of competence, etc.). Constant interference has substantially affected my academic freedom in the 
last few years. 
Different understanding of what my discipline is and should in regards to teaching. 
My ethical views 
Religious ethos 
Views on education, challenging and other members of staff and student's ideologies 
 
Question 21: Respondents’ personal knowledge/experience of academic freedom issues: 
Question 21 was a composite question which required respondents to utilise a five point scale to 
indicate their relative agreement/disagreement with the following statements: 
• Individual academic freedom for teaching is very important to me. 
• Individual academic freedom for teaching has declined in my institution in recent years. 
• Individual academic freedom for research is very important to me. 
• Individual academic freedom for research has declined in my institution in recent years. 
• My institution’s autonomy (i.e. the widest practical measure of freedom from state 
regulation) is very important to me. 
• Institutional autonomy has declined in my institution in recent years. 
• Self-governance (i.e. the right of academic staff to participate in the governance of a 
higher education institution) in my institution is very important to me. 
• Self-governance has declined in my institution in recent years. 
• Employment protection for academic staff in my institution (i.e. permanent contracts, which 
are not easily terminable for institutional reasons) is very important to me. 
• Employment protection for academic staff in my institution has declined in recent years. 
• The commercialisation of higher education is of great concern to me. 
• The commercialisation of higher education has increased in recent years. 
• I believe that the implementation of the Government’s Research Excellence Framework 
has diminished my individual academic freedom. 
• I am concerned that the implementation of the Government’s proposed Teaching 
Excellence Framework will diminish my individual academic freedom.  
In sum, this question addressed the importance respondents’ attached to the substantive 
(freedom for teaching, freedom for academic freedom), and supportive elements (institutional 
autonomy, self-governance and employment protection) of academic freedom and whether they 
believed that these had declined in recent years.  Respondents were then asked whether 
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commercialisation of higher education was a concern to them, and whether commercialisation 
had increased.  Finally UCU members were asked their opinions of the impact of the Research 
Excellence Framework exercise, and the likely impact of the new Teaching Excellence 
Framework.  The results are given below in tables 27.1 to 27.14 
Table 27.1: Individual academic freedom for teaching is very important to me. 
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 62.1 67.4 
Agree 33.9 28.5 
Neither agree nor disagree 3.5 3.5 
Disagree 0.4 0.4 
Strongly disagree 0.1 0.2 
All (n= 6408) 100 (n = 4094) 100 (n = 2314) 
Welch ANOVA:     F=11.196    1 df     Significant at the 1% level  
 
Looking first at the substantive elements – freedom for teaching and research.  Although there are 
statistically significant differences between them, both UCU and the European cohorts 
agree/strongly agree that freedom for teaching (EU= 96.0%, UCU = 95.9%) and research 
(EU=97.8%, UCU 96.5%) is very important to them.  However, when examining beliefs about the 
decline in academic freedom for these scholarly activities, there are clear and strong differences 
between the two cohorts.  43.0% of the UCU respondents agree/strongly agree that academic 
freedom for teaching has declined, compared with 25.1% of European respondents.  Similarly, 
with respect to freedom for research, 45.6% of UCU respondents agree/strongly agree that this 
has declined, compared with 29.3% of European respondents.  Assessing the reasons for these 
differences can only be speculative without further research (for example, qualitatively via 
interviews); however, it is likely that the absence of constitutional and strong legal protection for 
academic freedom in the UK, conjoined to the total lack of job security creates an organisational 
environment and culture in which, as was noted earlier, Barnett observed that “academic freedom 
is not taken away; rather, the opportunities for its realisation are reduced”.81  
  
                                                 
81 R. Barnett, (1997) Higher Education: A Critical Business, Buckingham: SRHE/Open University Press, p. 53. 
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Table 27.2: Individual academic freedom for teaching has declined in my institution in recent years  
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 5.6 14.0 
Agree 19.5 29.0 
Neither agree nor disagree 33.3 43.0 
Disagree 31.8 11.1 
Strongly disagree 9.8 2.9 
All (n= 6388) 100 (n = 4081) 100 (n = 2307) 
Welch ANOVA:     F=556.915    1 df     Significant at the 1% level  
Table 27.3: Individual academic freedom for research is very important to me 
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 71.9 77.1 
Agree 25.9 19.4 
Neither agree nor disagree 1.8 3.0 
Disagree 0.2 0.4 
Strongly disagree 0.1 0.1 
All (n= 6392) 100 (n = 4081) 100 (n = 2311) 
Welch ANOVA:     F=6.764    1 df     Significant at the 1% level  
 Table 27.4: Individual academic freedom for research has declined in my institution in recent years 
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 6.0 16.6 
Agree 23.3 29.0 
Neither agree nor disagree 31.7 41.6 
Disagree 29.4 10.1 
Strongly disagree 9.6 2.7 
All (n= 6379) 100 (n = 4079) 100 (n = 2300) 
Welch ANOVA:     F=525.162    1 df     Significant at the 1% level  
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Turning to the supportive elements of academic freedom, focus concentrates on autonomy, 
governance, and tenure.  More than 85% of both UCU and European respondents agree/strongly 
agree, that these three elements are important, the last perhaps slightly more than the previous 
two.  As before, there are large differences between the two groups in terms of their perceptions 
of changes in autonomy, governance and tenure.  A clear majority (57.8%) of UCU respondents 
agree/strongly agree that institutional autonomy has declined, compared with 42.5% of European 
respondents; indeed the UCU proportion that strongly agreed with this statement was twice the 
size (23.8%) of that of the European respondents (11.3%).  Similarly, while 40.9% of the 
European respondents agreed/strongly agreed that self-governance had declined, this figure is 
much lower than that of 60.2% for the UCU cohort.  Moreover, 1 in 3 of all UCU respondents 
strongly agreed with this sentiment, compared with 1 in 7 of the European respondents.  The 
situation is possibly not as marked with regard to tenure – 66.6% of UCU respondents agreed that 
employment protection had declined (with 36.5% strongly agreeing), compared to 53.6% for the 
European cohort (with 23.5% strongly agreeing).  Employment security has disappeared from UK 
universities and f.e. institutions, but continues to exist in many EU nations.  
Table 27.5: My institution’s autonomy is very important to me 
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 48.5 59.7 
Agree 40.2 28.7 
Neither agree nor disagree 9.5 9.6 
Disagree 1.3 1.4 
Strongly disagree 0.4 0.6 
All (n= 6388) 100 (n = 4082) 100 (n = 2306) 
Welch ANOVA:     F=27.314    1 df     Significant at the 1% level  
Table 27.6: Institutional autonomy has declined in my institution in recent years 
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 11.3 23.8 
Agree 31.2 34.0 
Neither agree nor disagree 31.6 35.9 
Disagree 20.4 5.2 
Strongly disagree 5.4 1.0 
All (n= 6368) 100 (n = 4074) 100 (n =2294) 
Welch ANOVA:     F=416.688    1 df     Significant at the 1% level  
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Table 27.7: Self-governance in my institution is very important to me 
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 43.9 55.2 
Agree 43.6 36.0 
Neither agree nor disagree 10.9 7.9 
Disagree 1.3 0.6 
Strongly disagree 0.2 0.2 
All (n= 6386) 100 (n = 4078) 100 (n = 2308) 
Welch ANOVA:     F=73.079    1 df     Significant at the 1% level  
Table 27.8: Self-governance has declined in my institution in recent years  
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 14.4 33.5 
Agree 26.5 28.5 
Neither agree nor disagree 33.3 30.9 
Disagree 20.1 5.8 
Strongly disagree 5.8 1.3 
All (n= 6363) 100 (n = 4074) 100 (n = 2289) 
Welch ANOVA:     F=556.858    1 df     Significant at the 1% level  
Table 27.9: Employment protection for academic staff in my institution is very important to me. 
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 53.7 74.4 
Agree 36.9 21.8 
Neither agree nor disagree 7.6 3.2 
Disagree 1.4 0.3 
Strongly disagree 0.3 0.3 
All (n= 6389) 100 (n = 4082) 100 (n = 2307) 
Welch ANOVA:     F=281.471    1 df     Significant at the 1% level  
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Table 27.10: Employment protection for academic staff in my institution has declined in recent years. 
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 23.5 36.5 
Agree 30.1 30.1 
Neither agree nor disagree 23.6 25.0 
Disagree 17.9 6.8 
Strongly disagree 4.9 1.6 
All (n= 6381) 100 (n = 4074) 100 (n = 2307) 
Welch ANOVA:     F=246.210    1 df     Significant at the 1% level  
 
The next two elements of question 21 asked respondents to what extent they agreed that the 
commercialisation of higher education was of concern to them, and whether they thought that this 
had increased in recent years – the responses are summarized in tables 27.11 and 27.12, below.  
As can be seen, the majority of respondents in both UCU and European cohorts agreed that the 
commercialisation of higher education was of concern to them, although the proportion strongly 
agreeing among the UCU respondents was 75.1%, more than twice that of the European 
respondents (31.3%).  The same differences are evident (but more marked) with respect to 
respondents’ views about the increase in commercialisation.  94.9% of the UCU respondents 
strongly agreed/agreed that commercialisation of h.e. had increased, of which 74.5% strongly 
agreed, the corresponding figures for the European cohort were 89.5% and 26.4%.  The 
increased salience of the commercialisation of h.e. among the UCU respondents probably relates 
(inter alia) to the increase in tuition fees in the U.K. When first introduced in 1998 the tuition fee 
was set at £1000, but has grown steadily and now stands at £9,000 per year.  When compared 
with the other European nations the charging of fees at this level (or, indeed, any level) is 
aberrant.  It is still the case that in the majority of EU nations, home students (and, often, students 
from other EU nations) are either not required to pay tuition fees at all, or a very small fee, often 
as part of their registration.  
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Table 27.11: The commercialisation of higher education is of great concern to me 
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 31.3 75.1 
Agree 33.6 17.3 
Neither agree nor disagree 19.6 5.1 
Disagree 11.9 1.8 
Strongly disagree 3.7 0.8 
All (n= 6377) 100 (n = 4066) 100 (n = 2311) 
Welch ANOVA:     F=1402.492    1 df     Significant at the 1% level  
Table 27.12: The commercialisation of higher education has increased in recent years 
Response % EU % UCU 
Strongly Agree 26.4 74.5 
Agree 43.1 20.4 
Neither agree nor disagree 22.1 4.4 
Disagree 6.8 0.4 
Strongly disagree 1.6 0.3 
All (n= 6378) 100 (n = 4072) 100 (n = 2306) 
Welch ANOVA:     F=1837.246    1 df     Significant at the 1% level  
 
The final two elements of question 21 refer to the impact of the Research Excellent Framework 
(REF), and the proposed Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) on academic freedom.  As can 
be seen from table 14.13, the majority (56.6%) of UCU respondents agree/strongly agree that the 
REF had diminished their academic freedom, and although over 30% were undecided as to its 
effect, only 11.7% thought that the REF had not adversely affected their academic freedom. The 
precursor of the REF, the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE), was first introduced in the UK in 
1986.  Subsequent RAE reviews took place in 1989, 1992, 1996, 2001, and 2008. The REF 
replaced the RAE for the 2014 exercise, and the next such is due to take place in 2021. Not 
surprisingly, the impact of the RAE and REF has been debated widely within academic and 
beyond.  Murphy and Sage,82 for example, report that “The discussions around the REF … have 
tended to be negatively skewed …. Our analysis here suggests that many academics have 
genuine concerns about the implications of the REF affecting their morale, their sense of their role 
and, potentially, their employment within the sector.” Its impact on academic freedom has been 
                                                 
82 T. Murphy & D. Sage, (2015) “Perceptions of the UK’s Research Excellence Framework 2014”, Australian Universities 
Review, 57(2): 31-36  
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more difficult to judge, with some, like Nolan et al.,83 posing the question: “The Research 
Excellence Framework (REF): A major impediment to free and informed debate?”, while Smith et 
al. others have identified “threats to academic autonomy implied in the definition of expert review 
and the delimitation of reviewers, … and the framing of knowledge translation by the stipulation 
that impact ‘builds on’ research”.84  Similarly, Watermeyer’s assessment concluded that the REF 
“is viewed by academics as an infringement to a scholarly way of life; as symptomatic of the 
marketisation of higher education; and as fundamentally incompatible and deleterious to the 
production of new knowledge.”85  On balance, although the impact of the REF is problematic to 
assess, it would be difficult to argue it has strengthened academic freedom. 
Table 27.13 I believe that the REF has diminished my individual academic freedom  
Response % UCU 
Strongly Agree 30.3 
Agree 26.3 
Neither agree nor disagree 31.8 
Disagree 9.2 
Strongly disagree 2.5 
All (n= 2300) 100 (n = 2300) 
 
The impact of the incoming the Teaching Excellence Framework on academic freedom is hard to judge, 
as it still going through the legislative process and has been heavily criticized in the House of Lords.  
However, it is likely that its central tenet, the use of metrics like the NSS scores to calculate the TEF, 
will remain unaltered. The response of UCU members completing the survey is unequivocal, and even 
more marked than their opinion of the REF.  As can be seen in table 27.14 only 5.8% of respondents 
agree that the TEF will not diminish their academic freedom; by contrast, over 70% believe that the new 
legislation will diminish their academic freedom. Clearly the agreed calculation method for the TEF will 
be critical in ensuring its credibility among academics and students alike.  However, as with the REF, it 
is difficult to see how the TEF might increase academic freedom.  As has been noted, its focus on NSS 
scores, makes it more, rather than less, likely that academics will be required to reduce the difficulty of 
courses, to ensure that all students progress, and can hence demonstrate their satisfaction with such 
an outcome, thereby ensuring that the universities at which they study will get a good TEF score.  
  
                                                 
83 M. Nolan, C. Ingleton, & M. Hayter (2008) “The Research Excellence Framework (REF): A major impediment to free 
and informed debate?”, International Journal of Nursing Studies, 45: 487–488. 
84 S. Smith, V. Ward, & A. House, (2011) “‘Impact’ in the proposals for the UK’s Research Excellence Framework: 
Shifting the boundaries of academic autonomy”, Research Policy, 40(10): 1369.  
85 R. Watermeyer, (2016) “Impact in the REF: issues and obstacles”, Studies in Higher Education, 41(2): 199-214 
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Table 27.14 I am concerned that the proposed TEF will diminish my individual academic freedom. 
Response UCU (%) 
Strongly Agree 40.2 
Agree 29.5 
Neither agree nor disagree 24.5 
Disagree 4.7 
Strongly disagree 1.1 
All (n= 2309) 100 (n = 2309) 
 
Question 22: The final question in this section invited respondents to make any further comments 
concerning their experience of academic freedom.  A total of 420 responses were received, and 
their critical tone and timbre is very similar to responses obtained from other open-ended 
questions, namely the adverse impact of greater managerialism and commercialisation in higher 
education. Other comments highlighted the stark choices facing concerned staff, for example 
“This week I have experienced fear for the first time...if I lose my job, I lose my home and I lose 
my community, so I have to shut up and put up”. The full set of responses to this question are 
available on pages 294-323 in the Appendix Tables (available on request), and by way of 
illustration, the first 10 comments are given below in table 28. 
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Table 28 Examples of further comments on experience of academic freedom 
Response 
Far too much to say under this heading.  The marketisation / commercialisation of higher education has been an 
explicit objective of 'radical reform' in the UK since 2010.  it has been pressed forward despite abundant evidence 
that it will drive standards down and prices up.  At root, it is represents the suppression of the genuine academic 
values proper to the university in favour of the monetary values of the Marketplace.   We are still just beginning to 
go down this road, but its potential damage is incalculable.   Take to its (il)logical conclusion, it means the death of 
the university. 
I started teaching this year - that's affecting my answers 
I feel being a permanent full-legged academic staff difficult when I see around me so many colleagues being put 
on zero-hours or temporary contract and as such in insecure working conditions as well as the rise of teaching 
only contract which make academic promotion difficult for younger staff and other colleagues who have ideas and 
research to contribute but need to make do with such contracts. 
We seem to be recruiting students based on fee income rather than their capabilities for the courses they will be 
studying 
My institution does not engage with academics in a meaningful way in relation to governance. 
My answers are in respect of my current institution because you do not identify previous institutions separately. In 
a previous institution I have met much stronger control of my research agenda and enforcement by managers of a 
research agenda unrelated to academic enquiry but simply focused on requirements of previous REFS 
I have seen several colleagues in the last three years who either have spontaneously left or they have been fired--
with no official/transparent explanation--from one day to another.  
It is unclear to me whether the decline of academic freedom in my institution is caused mainly by the loss of 
autonomy to the government or the corporate culture which dominates the institution. I often feel that the latter is a 
more important factor (and the excessive fear of bad publicity by management) 
The commercialisation of HE in the past twenty years or so marks the greatest threat to academic freedom, both 
in terms of academics being pushed into having a more commercial direction to their work, and in the changed 
relations of staff and students. It's a bloody mess, basically! 
Note that I am a mathematician. Therefore it is hardly possible for me to publish or say any (maths) academic 
views that would upset any one.  
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11 The Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
The final part of the survey examined the respondents’ personal characteristics. This section of 
the survey contained some questions specific to the UK, and hence have no corresponding data 
from the European nations, but where comparable data is available it is reported.  
Question 23: Please select your gender. This question asked respondents to select their gender, 
but the question was phrased differently for UCU members, who were also given the option: “I 
would rather not say.  The results in table 29 below show that the majority of respondents are 
male in both cohorts.  If is assumed that the proportion of UCU respondents who preferred not to 
answer were equally spilt between male and female, this would suggest that the degree of gender 
inequality is slightly less in the UK than the EU.  
Table 29: Respondents’ gender 
Response % EU % UCU 
   
Male 61.9 57.0 
Female 38.1 38.7 
I would rather not say - 4.2 
All (n= 6449) 100 (n = 4140) 100 (n = 2309) 
 
Question 24: Is your gender the same as you were assigned at birth.  This question only 
appeared in the UCU survey, and as can be seen in table 30 below, less than 1% of respondents 
reported that their gender was now different from the birth gender.  
Table 30: Gender same as at birth 
Response UCU (%) 
Yes 96.0 
No 0.4 
I would rather not say 3.6 
All (n= 2290) 100 (n = 2290) 
 
Question 25: Please select your age range.  
In the UCU survey, respondents were asked to choose an age group, while the European survey 
asked the year in which respondents were born.  The European data was re-calibrated to make it 
comparable with the UCU data. The data, which is shown in Table 31, reveals an aging workforce 
– nearly a third of both cohorts are aged over 55.   
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Table 31: Age Range  
Age Cohorts % EU % UCU 
Under 25 0.2 0.1 
25 – 29 2.8 2.2 
30 – 34 8.6 6.5 
35 – 39 13.9 11.7 
40 – 44 15.4 11.3 
45 – 49 13.5 15.3 
50 – 54 13.5 19.4 
55 – 59 11.9 15.7 
60 – 64 9.6 11.4 
65 and over 10.5 6.5 
All (n= 6350) 100 (n = 4120) 100 (n =2230) 
χ 2 = 114.775     9 df     Significant at 1% level 
 
The bulk of respondents (EU=56.3%, UCU=57.7%) are aged 35-54, while the proportion under 35 
is 11.6% for the European cohort and 8.8% for the UCU. These figures suggest that the academic 
profession is skewed towards the elderly for both cohorts.  Assessing the reasons for this would 
require further research, but in the UK context these are likely to include greater job insecurity 
(following the removal of tenure) and salaries that have remained static (or declined) in real terms 
during the last decade, which have acted as a disincentive to those contemplating an academic 
career. 
 
Question 26: Please select your ethnicity.   
Question 26, which was only used for UCU members, asked respondents to indicate their 
ethnicity.  The results in table 32 show that 87.3% of UCU respondents are white, which suggests 
that greater efforts are required by higher education institutions to encourage students from ethnic 
minorities to enter higher education, and go on to take post-graduate qualifications, and enter the 
academic profession. 
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Table 32: Respondents Ethnicity (UCU only) 
Ethnic Group UCU (%) 
White – British 58.3 
White - Irish  4.7 
White – Other 24.3 
Black or British Black- African 0.2 
Black or British Black – Caribbean 0.0 
Black or British Black – Other 0.1 
Asian or British Asia – Bangladeshi 0.0 
Asian or British Asia – Indian 0.9 
Asian or British Asia - Pakistani 0.3 
Asian or British Asia – Other 0.6 
Chinese  0.5 
Mixed – White and Asian 0.7 
Mixed – White and Black African 0.0 
Mixed – White and Black Caribbean 0.1 
Other Ethnic group 2.8 
I would rather not say 6.3 
All (n= 2321) 100 (n = 2321) 
 
Question 27: Do you have a registered disability?  
Question 27 asked UCU respondents to state whether they had a registered disability.  As can be 
seen from table 33, circa only 6% of respondents stated that they had a registered disability, with 
5% indicating that they would rather not say. 
Table 33: UCU respondents with a registered disability 
Response UCU (%) 
Yes 5.9 
No 89.2 
I would rather not say 5.0 
All (n= 2296) 100 (n =2296) 
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Question 28: If you have a political affiliation, whereabouts approximately on the following scale, 
would you consider your affiliation to lie?  
Question 28 asked to respondents to determine, on a 9 point scale, their political affiliation. The 
results in table 34 show the UCU respondents to be more likely to affiliate with left, rather than 
right wing policies.  The difference between the two cohorts is statistically significant, but may 
reflect, to some extent, the nature of the differing sampling frameworks adopted.  The EU survey 
requested any member of the academic staff to participate, while the UCU survey was aimed just 
at UCU members.  Hence it is possible that, if the European survey had been sent only to 
members of academic professional associations or trade unions (e.g. the Dansk Magisterforening 
in Denmark, the Sveriges Universitetslärare och Forskare in Sweden, etc.) the spread of political 
affiliations among the respondents would more closely resemble the UCU profile. 
Table 34: Political affiliation 
Response % EU % UCU 
To the Left, Socialist, Social Democrat 18.2 27.6 
2 17.3 21.9 
3 20.9 23.1 
4 13.7 11.2 
Centre, Centrist  14.4 10.5 
6 7.6 2.4 
7 5.4 1.8 
8 1.4 0.6 
To the Right, Conservative, Republican 1.0 1.0 
All (n= 5788) 100 (n = 3640) 100 (n = 2148) 
χ 2 = 213.145     8 df     Significant at 1% level 
 
Question 29: In what type of institution do you work? 
Question 29 asked respondents to indicate in which type of institution they worked.  The results in 
table 35 show that the overwhelming majority work in higher, rather than further, education. It is 
therefore likely that respondents working in further education are under-represented in the survey.  
It is conceivable that f.e. lecturers providing h.e. courses may believe that, as they do not 
undertake research, academic is not a salient issue for them.  However, it may also be the case 
that f.e. staff are even less aware than their h.e. counterparts, with respect to academic freedom, 
and therefore less likely to complete the survey. 
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Table 35: Respondents’ type of institution  
Institution Type  UCU (%) 
Higher Education Institution 96.5% 
Further Education College 2.5% 
Alternative Provider, e.g. private h.e.i. 0.1% 
Other, please specify 0.9% 
All (n= 2320) 100% (n = 2320) 
 
Question 30:  For how long have you worked in your present institution? 
Question 30 asked respondents to indicate for how long they had worked in their present 
institution, and the results are shown below in table 36.  Although the differences between the two 
cohorts are statistically significant, they do show quite similar profiles.  However, a higher 
proportion of UCU respondents have spent less than 10 years in their current institution, when 
compared with the European respondents; conversely, a greater proportion of the European 
cohort had been in post in the same institution for 16 years or more. Some of these differences 
probably reflect different national customs.  For example, in the UK, degree students do not chose 
to study at the institution nearest to their home and, furthermore, will seldom chose to study for a 
post-graduate award at the same institution. In contrast, in countries like Sweden and Finland, 
most students will study at the local university; it is not uncommon for Finnish or Swedish 
academics to study for their first and postgraduate degrees at their local university, and then go 
on to spend all of their academic careers at the same university, more especially if they have 
been granted tenure. 
Table 36: Length of service in current institution 
Length of Service % EU % UCU 
Less than one year 4.3a 3.8a 
1 – 5 years 20.7a 24.8b 
6 – 10 years 18.7a 19.8a 
11 – 15 years 17.4a 18.6a 
16 – 20 years 12.2a 12.0a 
21 – 25 years 9.0a 9.1a 
More than 25 years 17.8a 11.9b 
All (n = 6447) 100 (n = 4129) 100 (n = 2318) 
χ 2 = 47.586     6 df     Significant at 1% level 
 
Question 31: Please select your job role. 
Question 31 asked respondents to specify their job role.  The results in table 37 show that the 
sample is probably skewed towards more senior grades, such as Professor and Reader, as few 
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university departments would have 28% of staff occupying such grades. However, given that 
people in such posts are highly research active and likely to have been in academia for some 
time, they may be more likely to have encountered problems regarding academic freedom, which 
is why they were drawn to complete the survey. 
Table 37: Job Role of Respondents 
Job Role UCU (%) 
Professor 19.8 
Principal Research Fellow 0.2 
Principal Lecturer 4.2 
Reader 8.3 
Senior Research Fellow 1.4 
Senior Lecturer 30.7 
Lecturer 23.0 
Research Fellow 2.7 
Senior Teaching Fellow 0.6 
Teaching Fellow 1.2 
Research Assistant 1.3 
Teaching Assistant 0.9 
Section Head/Manager (non-academic) 0.4 
Non-academic professional 1.0 
Other 4.4 
All (n=2318) 100 (n = 2318) 
 
Question 32. What is/are your broad teaching/research discipline(s) (e.g. Economics, etc.)? 
Question 32 asked respondents to name their academic area of research/teaching.  The results 
displayed in table 38 show that 32.3% were drawn from the pure and applied sciences; 37.9% 
from the social sciences, plus business, law and education and 23.5% from the Arts and 
Humanities. In essence these figures suggest that the respondents were drawn from a full range 
of academic disciplines, rather than being skewed in the direction of a specific subject area.   
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Table 38: Subject Disciplines of Respondents 
Response UCU (%) 
Agriculture/Veterinary Medicine 0.7 
Engineering 4.4 
Life Sciences 5.5 
Medical Sciences, Health Sciences 9.0 
Physical Sciences, Mathematics 8.3 
Computer Sciences 4.4 
Social and Behavioural Sciences 19.3 
Business and Administration, Economics 9.1 
Law 3.1 
Education/Teacher Training 6.4 
Arts and Humanities  23.5 
Other 5.9 
N/A - not an academic 0.5 
All (n=2310) 100 (n = 2310) 
 
Question 33. What is the nature of your present position?  
Question 33 asked respondents to indicate whether they had full or part-time positions.  As can be 
seen from table 39, over 80% of all respondents were in full time posts, with a greater proportion 
of UCU (than European) respondents holding part-time positions.  The differences between these 
groups was statistically significant, but at the 5%, rather than the 1%, level. 
Table 39: Present Position (PT/FT status) 
Response % EU % UCU 
Full time 83.4a 82.7a 
Part time 11.6a 13.3b 
Other 4.9a 3.9a 
All (n = 6429) 100 (n = 4119) 100 (n = 2310) 
χ 2 = 6.768     2 df     Significant at 5% level 
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Question 34. What type of contract are you on?  
Question 34 asked UCU respondents only to indicate what type of contact they were on. The 
results in table 40 show that just over 80% were on permanent contracts.  Hence one in five of all 
UCU respondents had little or no job security.  Such job insecurity is not unusual among post-
doctoral researchers, but as table 37 shows that approximately 2% of respondents were in such 
posts, the data in table 40 suggests a growing proportion of casualised labour, within academia 
with one person in five employed through the use of fixed term, zero hours, sessional and 
annualised hours contracts. 
Table 40: Job Role of Respondents 
Job Role UCU (%) 
Permanent 81.0 
Open ended 6.6 
Fixed term 7.1 
Zero hours 1.0 
Sessional 0.7 
Annualised hours 0.1 
Guaranteed minimum hours 0.2 
Other 3.2 
All (n=2311) 100 (n = 2311) 
 
Question 35/36. Contractual focus – research and/or teaching 
Question 35 and 36 (which were directed only at UCU staff) were related, as question 35 asked 
about the type of contract, while 36 asked what respondents said were their primary activities. 
The results are given in tables 41 and 42 below. 75.4% of respondents were on research only, or 
teaching and research contracts, and a similar proportion described their primary activities as 
research, and research and teaching.  Although the use of teaching and scholarship contracts has 
been mooted for staff who are not research active, and hence unlikely to have their work included 
in the next REF, table 42 shows that such contracts are employed less frequently than research 
and teaching contracts, and that, for the majority of UCU respondents, research rather than 
teaching is their primary activity.  Whether this will be the case after the Teaching Excellence 
Framework is implemented, remains to be seen. 
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Table 41: With which type of contract are you currently employed?  
Contract Type UCU (%) 
Research 7.0 
Research and Teaching 68.4 
Teaching and Scholarship 15.2 
Academic-related 6.3 
I don’t know 3.2 
All (n=2300) 100 (n =2300) 
Table 42. Please select your primary activity/ies: Teaching and Research 
Response UCU (%) 
Teaching and research 62.3 
Primarily research 11.9 
Primarily teaching 21.1 
Academic related (professional staff) 2.7 
Faculty management 1.9 
All (n=2294) 100 (n = 2294) 
 
Question 38. Are you a member of the UCU? 
Question 38 asked about UCU membership.  Given that the survey was only sent to UCU 
members, it is not surprising that, less than 1% of respondents indicated that they were not a 
member of the Union. 
Table 43: Are you a member of the University and College Union? 
Response UCU (%) 
Yes 98.7 
No 0.6 
I would rather not say 0.6 
All (n= 2312) 100 (n = 2312) 
 
Question 39: This question, invited respondents to make any further comments concerning 
academic freedom, in connection with their academic work and responsibilities, concluded the 
survey.  As with previous open ended questions, non-relevant text answers were removed, 
leaving a total of 306 responses in respect to this question.  Some responses were, like those to 
the other open-ended questions, highly critical of the way in which UK higher education is 
managed; a number of respondents indicated that academic freedom was important and that they 
were glad that UCU was working on this issue. The full set of responses to this question are given 
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on pages 324-344 in the Appendix Tables, and by way of illustration, the first 10 comments are 
given below in table 44. 
Table 44 Examples of “further comments on academic freedom” 
Response 
The assault in academic freedom has not been a single reduction but many years of 'chipping' away at it. It is 
getting to the point where there is less need for any kind of explicit denting of academic freedom because there is 
self-censorship or at attempt by institutions to direct research into less controversial areas. 
My current institution is quite good on these issues but past experiences have been very different and very 
problematic. 
One area in which I perceive a reduction in academic freedom is in the lack of real consultation during changes in 
University administration and organization, i.e. changes are imposed from the centre. 
I have never been threatened or sanctioned because of my academic views, research or teaching, but do not feel 
I have the freedom to research what I want in the way that I want to because of constraints imposed by academic 
disciplines as recognised by the REF etc. I sit between two departments, and was not entered in the last REF 
because they could not decide which unit of assessment to enter me under. 
award leader / partner college manager  
The students themselves are schizophrenically torn between growing levels of pressure (re to assessments and 
requirements) and infantilization (re to attendance etc.), on the one end, and their transformation into 
customers/clients who have to have a say on everything, including what we teach, on the other. Academia doesn't 
deserve to be called as such anymore. Our responsibility is immense and our work is (/used to be) one of the 
most important means to facilitate the creation of new generations of informed, cosmopolitan, autonomous and 
responsible citizens; but the commodification of the HE is killing universities in this country.  
In general I do feel that academic freedom is respected at both Faculty and University level, based on explicit 
comments by both Deans and vice chancellors (and other officers) in Senate.  
This is likely to be become, regrettably, and even more significant under the TEF. UCU are right to campaign on 
this and to find common cause with others (NUT NUS)  
Academic freedom also requires access to funding. If funding is denied, this can be, in effect, a form of censorship 
in and of itself.  
We are paid to bite the hand that feeds us, albeit responsibly and for its own good.  
 
In addition to comparing UCU with European respondents, a further analysis was undertaken 
comparing demographically defined cohorts within the UCU respondents. Constraints on 
academic freedom can affect all academic staff.  However, there may be some personal 
characteristics of staff (age, gender, ethnicity, etc.,) which may lead to constraints on their 
academic freedom, which are disproportionately greater than their peers.  To investigate on this, 
the responses by UCU staff were re-examined, but this time comparisons were undertaken 
between demographically defined cohorts within the UCU cohort, rather than with the European 
cohort, with respect to gender, age, ethnicity, and disability.  Hence, for example, the incidence of 
sexual harassment was examined to see if male and female respondents in the UCU data set 
reported similar/dissimilar levels of occurrence.  The use of the UCU survey in this way enables 
greater exploration of the data.  However, although ANOVA and chi squared tests can be used in 
such analyses, the demographic characteristics concerned can undermine the validity of such 
tests.  For example, less than 10 individuals, in a sample of over 2000 UCU respondents, 
indicated that they have had their gender reassigned, so trying to use groups as small as this for 
analysis produces meaningless statistics.  Moreover, in some circumstances, the chi square 
statistic indicates there are significant differences, but the actual underlying pairwise significance 
between groups is negligible. i.e. the overall proportions look significant but as the group sizes are 
very disparate – for example, when looking at the age of respondents, there were only 2 in the 
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under 25 age range cohort.  In consequence, there are minimal conclusions that can be safely 
drawn from such analyses of the data.  This is in contrast to, for example, the gender differences, 
where the analysis uses only two very large groups, and thus significant differences really are 
significant. 
Bearing such caveats in mind, the UCU data was split in accordance with the demographic 
groups defined in section 6 (age, gender, etc.) and then the relevant statistical tests re-run to see 
whether, for example, people from ethnic minorities are more likely to suffer restrictions on their 
academic freedom.  In Sections 1-5 of the report above, a total of 51 tables have been used to 
examine the differences between UCU and European cohorts.  In eight instances, the ANOVA or 
Chi Square statistics were not statistically significant at the 5% threshold.  In two instances, the 
statistics were significant at the 5% level; in the remaining 41 tests undertaken, the differences 
between the two cohorts were significant at the 1% level.  Comparing cohorts within the UCU 
responses (for example differences between male and female) produced a much smaller 
incidence of statistically significant relationships.  The Appendix Tables contain all tables relating 
to gender, age, ethnicity and disability that were statistically significant at the 5% level, on pages 
345-388.  Drawing on the tables in the Statistical Appendices, in 23 instances there were 
statistically significant differences at the 5% level or above, in relation to gender.  In respect to 
respondents’ age, in 28 instances statistically significant differences were found, but some of 
these were suspect, owing to the small cell sizes in some instances. Similarly, in respect to 
ethnicity, the analysis showed 17 instances in which ethnicity was a significant factor, but some of 
the tables again revealed very small cell sizes, owing to the very small number of ethnic minority 
respondents in the sample, which undermines the validity of the statistics.  Finally, with respect to 
persons with registered disabilities, the analysis showed 16 differences in which disability was a 
factor.  This is very surprising and worthy of further analysis.  5.9% of the sample said that they 
were disabled, with a further 5% not wishing to say.  These numbers, plus the dichotomous nature 
of the variable, suggests that the impact of disability, as evinced from the data analysis, is more 
likely to be real than to be a statistical aberration. In essence, people with a disability suffer 
greater encroachment upon their academic freedom than their peers who have no disabilities.  
 
12 Conclusion and Recommendations 
In sum, this study shows, unequivocally, that the levels of both the de jure and de facto protection 
for academic freedom are lower in the UK than in the other EU nations. Addressing these 
deficiencies will require a concerted effort by the UCU, both as an institution and in co-ordination 
with other relevant NGOs, first to raise awareness of the defining characteristics of academic 
freedom, such that the majority of UK academics have a more than adequate understanding of 
the concept and their (albeit meagre) legal protection, and second, to press for changes to the 
law.  
Assessing the de jure protection for academic freedom, in their definitive UK text on The Law in 
Higher Education, Farrington and Palfreyman commence the section on individual academic 
freedom with a quote from Karran’s comparative study, viz.: “in terms of the health of academic 
freedom, the U.K. is clearly the sick man of Europe”. In a footnote they quote further from the 
same source:  “in the U.K., there is no constitutional protection for either freedom of speech or 
academic freedom, the law on academic freedom is designed to ensure ‘just cause’ for 
employment termination, the academic staff have only a minor input in the decision making 
process, the Rector is an external appointment over which they have no rights, and academic 
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tenure exists for only a few staff, who are dwindling in number as retirement beckons”.86  
Farrington and Palfreyman make no attempt to question the veracity of this terse and 
uncompromising statement; moreover, as this study has confirmed, the constitutional and legal 
protection for academic freedom in the UK is among the very worst of all the EU nations. This lack 
of constitutional and legal protection is not peculiar to the liberties of academics, although it has a 
direct bearing on their work, which is not experienced in other professions. Rather, it is 
symptomatic of a democratic deficit which characterises the British unwritten constitution and its 
attendant political system, and which is brought into sharp focus when comparisons are made 
with other EU states, all of which have a form of written constitution, most of which use a 
proportional electoral system, none of which has an unelected second chamber.  This situation is 
unlikely to change and, indeed, may get worse if the UK exit from the European Union is followed 
by a British revocation of the European Convention on Human Rights, for which some members 
of the government have called.  
With respect to the de facto analysis, this study is the first such large scale, comprehensive, 
empirical analysis of the state of academic freedom among UCU members or, indeed, among the 
members of any h.e. professional association or union in the EU.  The study demonstrates that 
UCU members have a limited, barely adequate knowledge of the concept, and a consequent 
strong desire for more information and practical advice concerning it.  It also suggests that only a 
minority of UCU members were aware of their institution’s policy on academic freedom, or 
whether such a policy existed, suggesting higher education institutions need to do more to inform 
their staff about their academic freedom rights in relation to teaching, research, and governance.  
Despite not knowing much about the concept, most UCU respondents believed that recent years 
have seen a marked decline in their academic freedom.  To address this lack of knowledge, the 
UCU could launch a national campaign to raise awareness, and provide training materials and 
guidance at Branch level, so that where abuses do occur, they are recognized, recorded and 
monitored, and support is provided to individual members to enable them to successfully meet 
their academic responsibilities in regard to their teaching and research activities.  
In terms of respondents’ experience of academic freedom, the research has revealed that 
bullying, psychological pressure and self-censorship are all too commonplace within higher 
education institutions that are supposed to encourage their staff to pursue teaching and learning 
within an academic environment typified by the tolerance of others’ opinion and beliefs, and 
freedom of expression.  Furthermore, it is evident that particular demographic groups within the 
UCU suffer disproportionately, with respect to abrogation of their academic freedom.  Comparison 
of the UCU data with that from Europe shows that in the vast majority of cases reported, the 
situation in the UK (as typified by the UCU data) is significantly worse than in the European 
nations.  The analysis of de jure protection showed that the level of protection in the majority of 
the EU states is greater than in the UK.  It is likely that the higher level of de facto abuse of 
academic freedom experienced by UCU staff, is only possible because of the absence of any 
significant constitutional or legal protection for academic freedom in the UK.  In countries like 
Spain, where academic freedom is protected in the constitution and via the Ley Organica, and 
where academics have employment security, the possibility of (for example) of staff being bullied, 
with threats of dismissal, will be significantly lower than occurs in the UK.  
                                                 
86 T. Karran, (2007) “Academic Freedom in Europe: A Preliminary Comparative Analysis”, Higher Education Policy, 
20(3): 309, as cited in D. Farrington, and D. Palfreyman, (2012) The Law of Higher Education (2nd Edition), Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 456. 
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However, when there is no legal sanction available to counteract abuses to academic freedom, 
raising awareness of academic freedom among UCU members (which will make people more 
cognisant of the rights that they should be able to exercise, but are legally unable so to do), is 
likely to result in disillusionment for an increasingly demoralized profession.  One possible option 
for the UCU would be to make a submission to the joint ILO-UNESCO Committee of Experts on 
the Application of the Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel (CEART), which is 
responsible for assessing complaints against national governments in respect to alleged breaches 
of the 1997 UNESCO Recommendation on the Status of Higher Education Teaching Personnel. 
This route was followed by the Danish equivalent of the UCU, the Dansk Magisterforening (DM), 
largely after lobbying at national level had failed, and to make an appeal internationally.  Research 
that the lead author published in 2007 and 2009 showed that, utilising measures of academic 
freedom from the 1997 UNESCO Recommendation, (and reported above) the worst two nations 
in the EU for the protection of academic freedom were the UK and Denmark. This was reported in 
the press, and consequently discussed in the Danish Parliament. As a result the President of the 
DM, Ingrid Stage, set up an online petition requesting that the Danish parliament change the 
legislation on academic freedom, which attracted signatures from 6502 Danish academics.  
Consequently, the DM made a submission to the joint ILO-UNESCO Committee of Experts on the 
Application of the Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel (CEART), which is 
responsible for assessing complaints against national governments in respect to alleged breaches 
of the 1997 UNESCO Recommendation. Reporting in 2009, the CEART recommended that “the 
Government and the DM engage in social dialogue on issues of university governance”.87  
Previously, the government had largely ignored protests by DM at national level, however, the 
international appeal to UNESCO and its response, meant that the government was forced to act. 
In 2009, the Danish government established an evaluation team comprising five international 
academic experts from outside Denmark to examine the 2003 University Act.  The Evaluation 
Teams report concluded (p. 39) “article 17.2 of the 2003 University Act. … is seen by many 
academic staff members of the universities as a major symbol of the controversies around the 
Act, as it gives the institutional leadership the formal power to tell individual staff members which 
academic tasks to perform. The article could be regarded as an intrusion into traditional values 
and rights of academic university staff. … we find that the question can be raised whether article 
17.2 in all its details fits the Danish and European traditions with respect to academic freedom. … 
Taking these considerations into account, the Panel recommends the Parliament to remove or 
reformulate the article 17.2”.88 Consequently, the government was forced to draft a new university 
law in June 2011, Section 2 of which states explicitly: “The university has academic freedom. The 
university must protect the university's and the individual's research freedom”. 89 
The Danish submission was reliant on the de jure analyses undertaken by the first named author 
in 2007 and 2009,90 and which were considered in this report. At the time of the Danish 
                                                 
87 Committee of Experts on the Application of the Recommendations Concerning Teaching Personnel (CEART)  
“Allegation received from the Dansk Magisterforening (DM) of Denmark” in Joint ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts on 
the Application of the Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel Report: Tenth session Paris, 28 September – 2 
October 2009, Paris/Geneva: CEART/ILO, p. 38-44. 
88 A. Bladh, E. El-Khawas, A. Hasan, P. Maassen, G. Winckler, (2010) Danish University Evaluation 2009 – Evaluation 
Report, Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Science, p. 39 
89 LBK nr 695 af 22/06/2011 - Bekendtgørelse af lov om universiteter (Law No. 695 of 22/06/2011 – Ordinance of Law on 
Universities), retrieved from https://www.retsinformation.dk/forms/R0710.aspx?id=140435, 20th October 2016. 
90 T. Karran, (2007) “Academic Freedom in Europe: A Preliminary Comparative Analysis”, Higher Education Policy, 
20(3): 289-313. 
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submission the more detailed work on de jure protection, as detailed above, had not been 
undertaken. Moreover, the Dansk Magisterforening made no attempt to assess the de facto 
situation in Denmark by a survey such as has been undertaken for the UCU.  Despite these 
deficiencies, Dansk Magisterforening’s submission to UNESCO resulted in an external evaluation 
of the law in Denmark, which was subsequently changed.  For the UCU to undertake a similar 
submission to UNESCO would involve little additional investment, and would be a tangible 
demonstration to its members (especially those who completed the survey) that the Union is 
aware of the problems of academic freedom experienced by its members, and is willing, if 
necessary, to devote appropriate resources to seek a remedy. Moreover such a move would also 
support the UCU’s efforts to raise the awareness of these issues among its members, and bring 
them to the attention of the media. Indeed, and unlike as occurred in the Danish case, the detailed 
analysis of de jure and de facto protection for academic freedom in the UK revealed by this study, 
would provide a firm legal and empirical basis for such a submission, thereby markedly increasing 
its chances of success.  Without action of this kind, it is likely that academic freedom in the UK will 
descend into further, probably irreversible, decline. 
The UK is a signatory to the UNESCO 1997 Recommendation, and the other international 
covenants but national successive governments have repeatedly ignored the salient elements 
regarding academic freedom. The Danish experience shows that national governments are well 
experienced in, and adroit at, ignoring and/or muting protests about higher educational policy at 
national level.  When the results of research in academic freedom by the lead author were 
reported in the Danish national press, and discussed in the Danish Parliament, the Danish 
Minister, Helger Sander, disparaged the evidence in the article, and argued in the press that, 
given that ex-communist nations headed the EU academic freedom ranking, he was glad that 
Denmark did not.  In response, the DM President, Ingrid Stage stated in ForskerForum, (the 
monthly magazine of the Dansk Magisterforening) that: “The Danish university law’s degrees of 
freedom must now be tested against the international UNESCO declaration in response to an 
inquiry by the English scientist Terence Karran from Lincoln University which showed that Danish 
academic freedom is fully depressed in western context”.91  However, as the impact of the DM’s 
submission to UNESCO showed, national governments are less practised at dealing with 
international NGOs, whose calls for action they cannot so readily ignore. The documentation 
submitted to UNESCO by DM is obtainable, use of which as a template would reduce the cost 
and the time of the UCU in preparing its own submission.  Moreover, the inclusion of data relating 
to the UK’s non-compliance with international agreements other than the UNESCO 
Recommendation, (like the ICCPR and the ICESCR, which were not included in the Danish 
submission) and the data gathered by this study on the low level of de facto protection would 
significantly strengthen such a submission, and increase the likelihood that the CEART would 
recommend that the UK government takes action to remedy the situation. Given that the CEART’s 
response to a submission from UCU would be widely reported in the national and international 
media, it is difficult to see how the incumbent (or any future) Minister of State for Universities, 
Science, Research and Innovation could ignore it. 
 
Terence Karran and Lucy Mallinson,  March 12th 2017 
                                                 
T. Karran, (2009) “Academic Freedom in Europe: Reviewing UNESCO's Recommendation”, British Journal of Educational 
Studies, 57(2): 191–215. 
91 I. Stage, (May 2008) “Sander ignorerer frihedsgrader” (Sander ignores degrees of freedom) ForskerForum, No. 214, p. 14. 
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